Police Operations

Analysis Report

Ontario, Oregon

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POLICE OPERATIONS POLICE OPERATIONS

CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT

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ICMA

Leaders at the Core of Better Communities

Background

About ICMA

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is a 100-year-old, nonprofit professional association of local government administrators and managers, with approximately 9,000 members located in 28 countries.

Since its inception in 1914, ICMA has been dedicated to assisting local governments in providing services to their citizens in an efficient and effective manner. Our work spans all of the activities of local government: parks, libraries, recreation, public works, economic development, code enforcement, brownfields, public safety, and a host of other critical areas.

ICMA advances the knowledge of local government best practices across a wide range of platforms including publications, research, training, and technical assistance. Our work includes both domestic and international activities in partnership with local, state, and federal governments as well as private foundations. For example, we are involved in a major library research project funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and we are providing community policing training in El Salvador, Mexico, and Panama with funding from the United States Agency for International Development. We have personnel in Afghanistan assisting with building wastewater treatment plants and have teams in Central America conducting assessments and developing training programs for disaster preparedness working with SOUTHCOM.

ICMA *Center for Public Safety Management*

The ICMA *Center for Public Safety Management (*ICMA/CPSM*)* is one of four Centers within the ICMA's U.S. Programs Division, providing support to local governments in the areas of police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, and homeland security. In addition to providing technical assistance in these areas, we also represent local governments at the federal level and are involved in numerous projects with the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

ICMA/CPSM is also involved in police and fire chief selection, assisting local governments in identifying these critical managers through original research and the identification of core competencies of police and fire managers and also by providing assessment center resources.

Our local government technical assistance includes workload and deployment analysis, using operations research techniques and credentialed experts to identify workload and staffing needs, and identifying best practices. We have conducted approximately 150 such studies in 100 communities ranging in size from 8,000 population (Boone, Iowa) to 800,000 population (Indianapolis, Indiana).

Thomas Wieczorek is the Director of the Center for Public Safety Management. Leonard Matarese is the Director of Research & Project Development for the Center.

Methodology

The ICMA Center for Public Safety Management team follows a standardized approach to conducting analyses of police and other departments involved in providing services to the public. We have developed this standardized approach by combining the experience sets of dozens of subject matter experts in the areas of police, fire, and EMS. Our collective team has more than one hundred years of conducting research in these areas for cities in and beyond the United States.

The reports generated by the operations and data analysis team are based upon key performance indicators that have been identified in standards and safety regulations and by special interest groups such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), International Police Association, and the Association of Public Safety Communication Officials International, and through the Center for Performance Measurement of ICMA. These performance measures have been developed following decades of research and are applicable in all communities. For this reason, the data yield similar reporting formats, but each community's data are analyzed on an individual basis by the ICMA specialists and represent the unique information for that community.

The Public Safety Management team begins most projects by extracting calls for service and raw data from a public safety agency's computer-aided dispatch system. The data are sorted and analyzed for comparison to nationally developed performance indicators. These performance indicators (e.g., response times, workload by time, multiple-unit dispatching) are valuable measures of agency performance regardless of departmental size. The findings are shown in tables and graphs organized in a logistical format. Due to the size and complexity of the documents, a consistent approach to structuring the findings allows for simple, clean reporting. While the categories for the performance indicators and the overall structure of the data and documents follow a standard format, the data and recommendations are unique to the organization under scrutiny.

The team conducts an operational review in conjunction with the data analysis. The performance indicators serve as the basis for the operational review. The review process follows a standardized approach comparable to that of national accreditation agencies. Prior to the arrival of an on-site team, agencies are asked to provide the team with key operational documents (e.g., policies and procedures, asset lists, etc.). The team visits each city on-site to interview police agency management and supervisory personnel, rank-and-file officers, and local government staff.

The information collected during the site visits and through data analysis results in a set of observations and recommendations that highlight strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the organizations and operations under review. To generate recommendations, the team reviews operational documents; interviews key stakeholders and observes physical facilities; and reviews relevant literature, statutes and regulations, industry standards, and other information and/or materials specifically included in a project's scope of work.

The standardized approach ensures that the ICMA Center for Public Safety Management measures and observes all of the critical components of an agency, which in turn provides substance to benchmark against localities with similar profiles. Although agencies may vary in size, priorities,

and challenges, there are basic commonalities that enable comparison. The approach also enables the team to identify best practices and innovative approaches.

In general, the standardized approach adopts the principles of the scientific method: We ask questions and request documentation upon project start up; confirm accuracy of information received; deploy operations and data analysis teams to research each unique environment; perform data modeling; share preliminary findings with the jurisdiction; assess inconsistencies reported by client jurisdictions; follow up on areas of concern; and communicate our results in a formal, written report.

ICMA Center for Public Safety Project Contributors

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Contents

Tables

Figures

Executive Summary

ICMA was commissioned to review the operations of the Ontario Police Department (OPD). While our analysis covered all aspects of the department's operations, a particular focus of our study was on identifying the appropriate staffing of the agency given its workload, community demographics, and crime levels.

We analyzed departmental workload using operations research methodology and compared that workload to staffing and deployment levels. We reviewed other performance indicators, which allowed us to understand the implications of service demand on current staffing. We reviewed the department's organizational design to determine if the many functions required of a modern police agency are staffed appropriately.

Our study involved data collection, interviews with key police and administration personnel, on-site observations of the job environment, data analysis, comparative analyses, and development of alternatives and recommendations. The general recommendations appear below and are described in detail throughout the report.

Major Recommendations

In general, ICMA concludes that the OPD is an outstanding department. Overall, however, the department is under-resourced, and needs additional personnel, technological, equipment, and plant resources to address the crime and disorderly conditions in the community. The recommendations offered in this report should be viewed as opportunities for the department to provide even better services to the Ontario community.

- Empanel a calls for service (CFS) committee to evaluate service demands and attempt to reduce and/or eliminate nonemergency responses.
- Create a working committee to explore the reconfiguration of patrol shifts.
- Create the position of operations commander, at the rank of captain, to coordinate patrol and investigations.
- Develop a traffic safety strategy integrating the three E's (enforcement, engineering, education) of traffic safety.
- Assign officers on patrol to act as traffic safety officers as needed.
- Empanel a technology committee to identify and recommend acquisition of appropriate technology for all department needs.
- Increase staffing in code enforcement by one half-time employee.
- Create a Criminal Investigations Unit of three properly trained, properly equipped detectives (one detective supervisor and two case detectives).

- Add a half-time civilian staff position to the investigations unit to assist with case management, crime analysis, and criminal intelligence.
- Designate a single supervisor to administrative responsibilities
- Attempt to identify additional opportunities for volunteers to augment police services.
- Provide training to the office manager in the fundamentals of effective law enforcement data reporting so the manager is able to work in collaboration with the operations commander to implement the department's performance management system.
- Implement auxiliary software to supplement the JUSTICE systems in collating and compiling effective data retrieval.
- Install signage identifying the building as OPD Headquarters.
- Upgrade the physical security of both the police facility and the evidence storage areas.
- Hire a professional firm to conduct a space needs assessment.
- Explore the development and implementation of a performance-based approach to manage the police department.
- The department must develop and implement a multiyear strategic plan.

Implementing these recommendations would result in additional personnel assignments and modified organizational structure. The new Table of Organization for the OPD under these changes appears in Table 1.

TABLE 1: Recommended Organization Structure and Personnel

	Chief	Capt.	Sgt.	PO/Det.	Civilian
Executive	1				1
Administration			1		1
Operations		1			
Patrol			4	14	1.5
SRO				2	
Investigations			1	2	.5
HDTF				1	
Total	1	1	6	19	4.5
				Total Sworn: 27	

Civilian Personnel:

- One office manager (in Executive office)
- One half-time evidence technician (in Administration)
- One full-time and one half-time ordinance enforcement officer (in Patrol)

- One half-time crime/intelligence analyst (in Investigations)
- One half-time administrative specialist (in Administration)

ICMA staff thanks the city and police administrations of Ontario for their assistance in completing this project. In particular, ICMA commends Police Chief Mark Alexander for his enthusiasm and cooperation with ICMA staff regarding documentation requests and the overall project.

Methodology

Data Analysis

We used numerous sources of data to support our conclusions and recommendations for the Ontario Police Department. Information was obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, Part I offenses, along with numerous sources of OPD internal information. UCR Part I crimes are defined as murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and larceny of a motor vehicle. Internal sources included data from the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system for information on calls for service (CFS).

Interviews

This study relied extensively on intensive interviews with OPD personnel. On-site and in-person interviews were conducted with all division commanders regarding their operations. We interviewed representatives of the operational, administrative, and staff positions to get an understanding of the department and how it functions.

Focus Groups

A focus group is an unstructured group interview in which the moderator actively encourages discussion among participants. Focus groups generally consist of eight to ten participants and are used to explore issues that are difficult to define. Group discussion permits greater exploration of topics. For the purposes of this study, focus groups were held with representatives of the department.

Document Review

ICMA consultants were furnished with numerous reports and summary documents by the Ontario Police Department. Information on strategic plans, personnel staffing and deployment, evaluations, training records, and performance statistics were provided.

Operational/Administrative Observations

Over the course of the evaluation period, numerous observations were conducted. These included observations of general patrol, special enforcement, investigations, and administrative functions. ICMA representatives engaged all facets of department operations from a "participant observation" perspective.

Implementing the Report's Recommendations

ICMA's conclusions and recommendations are a blueprint for both the city and police administrations. The city manager should have periodic meetings with the OPD to ensure that ICMA's recommendations are implemented. It is strongly recommended that the chief of police identify and task one individual with lead responsibility for implementing these recommendations. This person should be given the authority and responsibility to effectuate the changes

recommended. The recommendations should be executed in a timely fashion and the department's progress in meeting the recommendations should be evaluated every six months for efficiency, effectiveness, and performance.

All of ICMA's recommendations are practical and sensible and should be implemented by the police administration within a reasonable period of time. If the city desires, ICMA can provide a service to review, monitor, and evaluate the department's progress and ensure that the recommendations are being implemented properly. If the police administration continues to have difficulty implementing the recommendations, ICMA can assist with implementation.

Background

Policing involves a complex set of activities. Police officers are not simply crime fighters whose responsibilities are to protect people's safety and property and to enhance the public's sense of security. The police have myriad other basic responsibilities on a daily basis, including preserving order in the community, guaranteeing the movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, protecting and extending the rights of persons to speak and assemble freely, and providing assistance for those who cannot assist themselves.

The Ontario Police Department provides a full range of police services, including responding to emergencies and calls for service, performing directed activities, and solving problems. Both the city and the police department are dedicated to the principles of community policing, and the department strives to provide a high level of service to the Ontario community.

Ontario Demographics

When determining the appropriateness of the deployed resources—both current and future—a key factor for consideration is the demographics of the community.

Ontario is the largest city in Malheur County. It lies along the Snake River at the border of Idaho, and is about a one-hour drive to Boise. In 2012, Ontario had an estimated 11,143 residents, which is a slight decrease from the 2010 estimate of 11,366.

The racial makeup of the city is estimated to be 53.3 percent white, 41.3 percent Hispanic, 0.7 percent African-American, 2.2 percent Asian, and 2.5 percent other.

The median household income in Ontario is $30,545, which is about 39 percent lower than the median Oregon household income. Similarly, on average between the years 2008-2012, 31.9 percent of the Ontario population was below the poverty level, which is much higher than the statewide rate of 15.5 percent.

Uniform Crime Report/Crime Trends

As defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, the seven major Part I offenses are used to measure the extent, fluctuation, and distribution of serious crime in a defined geographic area. Part I crimes are the seven most serious offenses in two categories (violent and property crime). Serious violent crime is defined as murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Serious property crime is defined as burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.

As can be seen in Table 2, in 2012 Ontario reported a UCR Part I violent crime rate of 723 violent crimes per 100,000 residents. For UCR Part 1 property crimes, the rate in Ontario was 7,543 property crimes per 100,000 residents. The violent crime rate in Ontario is almost three times higher (291.5 percent) than the state rate and 86.8 percent higher than the national rate. The rate

of property crime is 234 percent higher (more than double) than the state rate and 263.8 percent higher than the national rate.

TABLE 2: 2012[1] UCR Crime Comparisons

Agency	Population	Violent Crime Rate*	Property Crime Rate*
U.S.	313,914,040	387	2,859
Oregon	3,899,353	248	3,224
Population Comparison			
Pendleton	16,903	225	4,999
The Dalles	13,728	168	4,953
La Grande	13,195	167	3,804
Gladstone	11,709	239	3,109
Ontario	11,348	723	7,543
Baker City	9,807	10	622

Note: * = per 100,000.

We compared Ontario's crime rate to other communities in Oregon. To do this, we took information from the FBI UCR Program on *Crime in the United States* and compared Ontario with other jurisdictions of similar populations. For this analysis Pendleton, The Dalles, La Grande, Gladstone and Baker City were selected. It should be noted that the demographics of these communities encompass a wide range and the analysis is not intended to compare Ontario with Pendleton or Baker City, for example. It is meant as an illustration of communities in Oregon and how they compare with respect to rates of crime.

Examination of the comparisons presented in Table 2 shows that Ontario has a crime rate that compares unfavorably with these jurisdictions. Out of the six jurisdictions presented, Ontario is the second smallest but has the highest violent and property crime rates.

Over the past ten years, the rate of crime in Ontario has fluctuated and is currently on the rise. Figure 1 shows the rates of both violent and property crime between 2003 and 2012. During this time Ontario experienced a persistently high property crime rate, and a violent crime rate that spiked in 2007 and 2008, then dropped, and is currently on the rise. Figure 2 compares the violent crime rate in Ontario with the statewide rate over the last decade. According to this figure the violent crime rate in Oregon remained relatively stable and the rate in Ontario was persistently high and subject to spikes over a number of years. Based on the information about crime rates, it can be concluded that Ontario is a relatively high crime community and the OPD needs to take steps to combat these occurrences more aggressively.

[1] At the time of this report only 2012 UCR data were available on comparison jurisdictions.

FIGURE 1: Ontario Crime Rates, 2003-2012



FIGURE 2: Ontario vs. Statewide Violent Crime Rate, 2003-2012



Our report now turns to the various elements of the OPD and an assessment of those elements in context with prevailing industry standards and best practices.

Comparisons/Benchmarks

In order to put the OPD into perspective on a wider scale, it is important to compare it with police department benchmarks. In a 2011 study, IBM looked at several financial, organizational, and demographic variables to assess the relative efficiency of local governments. The resulting report,

Smarter, Faster, Cheaper, presents data from the 100 largest U. S. cities in various regions.[2] In addition, the Overland Park, Kansas, Police Department conducts an annual survey of 26 small- to medium-sized police departments each year on, among other measures, the same measures reported in the IBM report. This Overland Park report, entitled "Benchmark Cities Survey,"[3] is also useful for comparative evaluation. Furthermore, the Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes periodic reports on the administrative and managerial characteristics of police departments in the United States.[4] Keeping in mind that each community has characteristics that govern the style and size of its police department, these characteristics and comparisons can help assess the relative performance of the OPD.

These documents are useful in benchmarking the OPD on several key variables, including per-capita spending on police services, spending per crime, number of sworn personnel per crime, overtime expense, and sworn officers per capita (see Table 3).

According to the city of Ontario Adopted Budget for the fiscal year 2013-2014, the community plans to spend approximately $2.5 million on police services. On average, this equals $226 per capita on police services, which is lower than the average of $323 per capita presented in the IBM report and on par with the $217 per capita presented in the Benchmark Cities Survey. Ontario's 2012 crime rate of 8,266 serious crimes per 100,000 residents is higher than the average crime rate of 5,000 crimes per 100,000 among the cities in the IBM report and is more than double the average crime rate reported in the Benchmark Cities Survey. Also, the OPD plans to spend approximately $104,800 on overtime expenses in FY2013-14 out of an operating budget of approximately $2.5 million. This represents approximately 4.2 percent of total budget. This overtime-to-budget ratio is lower than the benchmark on police overtime expenses from the IBM report and higher than the Benchmark Cities Survey. Lastly, the OPD authorized strength is 22 sworn officers, or 194 officers per 100,000, which, is higher than the average of 190 officers per 100,000 residents from the IBM study, and also higher than the 144 officers per 100,000 residents from the Benchmark Cities Survey.

TABLE 3: Ontario Police Department in Perspective

Benchmark Area	OPD	IBM Benchmark	Vs. IBM Benchmark	Benchmark City Survey	Vs. Benchmark City Survey
Per capita police spending	$226	$323	LOWER	$217	HIGHER
Crime rate	8,266	5,000	HIGHER	3277	HIGHER
Overtime	4.2%	5%	LOWER	3.8%	HIGHER
Officers per capita	194	190	HIGHER	144	HIGHER

[2] David Edwards, *Smarter, Faster, Cheaper: An Operational Efficiency Benchmarking Study of 100 US Cities* (Somers, NY: IBM, 2011), available at http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_network/documents/kn/Document/303182/Smarter_Faster_Cheaper.
[3] http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/
[4] Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics* (2007).

Overall, the OPD earns mixed marks for financial benchmarks. The cost of operations appears lower in some areas and higher in others. This is related to many factors that will be discussed in the body of the report. In brief, the department spends less for more officers per capita, and has a mixed experience with regards to comparison reports on spending per capita and overtime, with higher levels of crime and a higher level of officers per capita. The mixed results are likely due to the characteristics of the cities included in the different sources. The IBM report focused on the 100 largest cities, and the Benchmark Cities Survey focuses on an availability sample of smaller communities.

The key to operational efficiency, however, is not found exclusively in financial austerity. The size and style of a police department and the types of services that it provides are a reflection of the character and demands of that community. The challenge is to determine how many police officers are necessary to meet that demand, and how to deploy those personnel in an effective and efficient manner. The analysis that follows is an attempt to build upon this discussion and answer the "how many" and "how to deploy" questions that are the essence of police operational and personnel resource decisions.

Our report now turns to the various elements of the OPD and an assessment of those elements in context with prevailing industry standards and best practices.

Patrol Division

The OPD provides the community with a full range of police services, including responding to emergencies and calls for service (CFS), performing directed activities, and solving problems. The OPD is a service-oriented department that provides a high level of service to the community. Essentially, every call for service from the public gets a police response and every criminal case gets investigated. The department embraces this approach and considers every request for service from the public important and deserving of a police response.

One noticeable shortcoming in the patrol division is the lack of a commander. The four patrol sergeants report directly to the chief. Also, the policy of assigning criminal investigations to patrol officers should be revisited. Furthermore, the patrol division needs to embrace a more proactive approach to crime, traffic, and disorder in the community. The addition of an operations commander in the rank of captain would be instrumental in providing this needed level of support.

Demand

It was reported to the ICMA team that no call is considered too minor to warrant a response and no case is too small to warrant an investigation. The result of this policing philosophy is the delivery of comprehensive policing services to the Ontario community. The department has the hallmark of a small-town approach to policing, in which people are not just citizens but members of a community. Service is personalized, the police are part of the fabric of the community, and expectations for police service are high.

This approach is not without costs, however. Considerable resources are needed to maintain the small-town approach. The patrol division must be staffed with enough officers to respond to virtually every call placed to the OPD.

When examining options for the department's direction, the town and the department face the choices of a) continuing to police the community in a full-service mode, or b) taking steps to restructure demand and still promote order and safety. That is, the department must decide whether to sustain its comprehensive level of police service or take the steps necessary to manage public demand. Essentially, this is a political decision regarding the quantity of police services offered to the Ontario community. But quality doesn't need to suffer. The recommendations offered regarding operations, if implemented, will permit the OPD to continue its full-service model of policing yet run the agency more efficiently.

Recommendation:

- Empanel a calls for service (CFS) committee to evaluate service demands and attempt to reduce and/or eliminate responses to nonemergency situations.

TABLE 4: Calls for Service

Category	Police-initiated			Other-initiated		
	Calls	Units per Call	Minutes	Calls	Units per Call	Minutes
Accidents	13	1.2	41.9	387	1.3	28.7
Alarm	2	1.5	12.5	222	1.7	12.1
Animal calls	13	1.2	27.6	307	1.1	24.2
Assist other agency	203	1.2	21.5	429	1.3	27.9
Check/investigation	1,416	1.2	19.3	1,133	1.4	22.1
Crime–persons	26	1.3	20.1	727	1.6	29.2
Crime–property	137	1.2	15.7	1,490	1.3	24.3
Disturbance	17	1.7	16.4	591	1.7	19.5
Juvenile	8	1.4	30.5	81	1.1	28.0
Miscellaneous	223	1.2	22.4	407	1.3	22.2
Prisoner–arrest	219	1.7	25.4	154	1.6	22.9
Prisoner–transport	295	1.0	45.5	12	1.0	47.4
Public order	42	1.4	27.7	172	1.5	19.7
Suspicious person/vehicle	17	1.4	15.8	482	1.7	16.0
Traffic enforcement	1,372	1.1	9.5	239	1.4	21.4
Total	**4,003**	**1.2**	**18.6**	**6,833**	**1.4**	**23.2**

Note: We removed 28 calls with inaccurate busy times.

Table 4 presents the main categories of calls for service received from the public that the OPD handled during the period January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013. In total, OPD officers were dispatched to 10,836 calls during that 12-month period, or approximately 29.7 calls per day.

In general, CFS volume in Ontario is within acceptable bounds. The OPD does a good job handling the service demands from the public, and it appears that the patrol function is appropriately staffed. At the same time, the quantity and quality of calls for service can be examined for potential for operational efficiencies.

To evaluate the workload demands placed on the OPD, it is useful to examine the number of CFS received from the public in relation to the population size. As noted, the OPD handles about 10,836 calls per year. With a population estimated to be approximately 11,348, this translates to about 955 CFS per 1,000 residents. While there is no accepted standard ratio between calls for service and population, ICMA studies of other communities show a CFS-to-population ratio ranging between 400 and 1,000 CFS per 1,000 persons per year. Lower ratios typically suggest a well-managed approach to CFS. The value of 955 CFS/per thousand/year would suggest a fairly open policy for accepting CFS. In other words, there is little or no filter between the CFS made by the public and a response by an OPD officer. A well-managed dispatch system would include a system where CFS are

screened and nuisance calls eliminated before they are dispatched. With a ratio of 955, it would appear that a screening system is not used aggressively by call takers and dispatchers. However, closer examination of the call categories indicate a very high level of police-initiated CFS. With 4,003 CFS, or 36.9 percent, of all CFS initiated by OPD officers, this indicates a fairly proactive approach by officers on patrol. These CFS include 1,370 traffic CFS, and 1,414 "check/investigate" CFS, which shows a high level of traffic enforcement and proactive patrol. Therefore, the seemingly high ratio of CFS to population is inflated by proactive officers on patrol.

The result could also be that OPD patrol officers are dispatched to many calls that may not require a police officer. Higher ratios are not uncommon is communities the size of Ontario. Given the operational philosophy of the department and the demographics of the community, a high ratio would be expected and, while the OPD is on the high-end of the scale, it is within range of expectations. However, there are steps that could be taken to triage the calls more efficiently, which would likely result in a decrease in the volume of CFS, and provide additional time for units on patrol to be even more proactive addressing crime and disorder in the community.

Certain types of calls do not necessarily require the response of a sworn police officer. For example, at motor vehicle accidents involving only property damage, the police role is largely administrative: preparing and filing reports. Similarly, industry experience also tells us that greater than 98 percent of all burglar alarms are false alarms. Also, the indiscriminate assignment of police officers to nuisance calls does nothing more than appease a caller who does not have a police emergency in the first place. The bottom line here is that a substantial number of CFS dispatches to officers in the OPD could be eliminated.

The alarm industry is a strong advocate of developing ordinances and procedures to address police response to false alarms and will work closely with any agency exploring this issue. The 98 percent of alarm calls that are false are caused by user error, and this can be addressed by alarm management programs. Although the OPD has an alarm verification program and uses this program to limit the number of false alarms received, many unnecessary alarms appear to be dispatched and it could be worthwhile for the department to revisit policies in this area.

Automobile accidents are another category for which the response by a sworn officer is questionable. Most accidents involve only property damage to vehicles and the role of an officer is simply report preparation. When injuries occur or vehicles are inoperable and blocking traffic, however, police response is important. Proper training of dispatchers and inquiries by dispatchers during the initial call-taking process can easily triage vehicle accident calls to determine which ones require a police response. Dispatching police officers to all vehicle crashes is not recommended. Examination of Table 4 indicates that 5.7 percent of public CFS handled during the study period were traffic accidents. Arguably, most of these calls were administrative in nature and did not necessarily warrant the response of a sworn police officer.

Table 4 also indicates that OPD officers handled 407 "miscellaneous" calls. This category of CFS is generally used to label calls that are not criminal in nature and have a limited relationship to police

responsibilities. This category essentially becomes a catch-basin for calls that are dispatched to patrol units, but that are not police-related.

Combined, three categories of CFS (387 auto accidents, 222 burglar alarms, 407 miscellaneous) amount to 15 percent of the other-initiated CFS in the study period. These categories of CFS must be examined carefully. It should be noted that the concentrations of CFS in these categories is low compared to other agencies of similar size that ICMA has studied. The OPD should be commended for creating an efficient system of CFS response. Nonetheless, efficient use of scare resources dictate that responses to nonemergency situations be minimized to the greatest extent possible. It is recommended, therefore, that the OPD establish a committee that includes all the principal stakeholders in this process and which has the responsibility of evaluating the CFS workload with an eye toward reducing nonemergency CFS response. This committee should begin with these three major categories of CFS response and formulate the response (or nonresponse) protocols for these assignments.

ICMA recommends that from a policy perspective the responses to major categories of CFS be reduced, including responses to traffic accidents involving only property damage; an alarm callback system be instituted; and 911 call takers and dispatchers be trained to trigger a police response in cases only when warranted.

Further examination of various elements of the CFS and patrol response data also warrants discussion. Data from various tables and charts in the data analysis section of this report provide a wealth of information about demand, workload, and deployment in Ontario. Four key pieces of information need to be highlighted to demonstrate the effective use of patrol resources in Ontario. These three statistics are found in the data analysis section under Figure D2, Events per Day, by Category; Table D6, Primary Unit's Average Occupied Time; Table D7, Number of Responding Units; and Table D11, Average Response Time. Taken together these statistics provide an excellent lens through which to view the efficiency of patrol operations. Table 5 provides an overview of these data

TABLE 5: OPD CFS Efficiency

Benchmark Area	OPD	ICMA Benchmark	Vs. ICMA Benchmark
CFS to Population Ratio	955	400-1000	HIGH
Administrative Time	8.4%	14%	LOWER
Average Service Time "other-initiated" CFS	23.2	30.0	LOWER
Average units assigned "other-initiated" CFS	1.4	1.6	LOWER
Response Time	10.0	15	LOWER

According to Figure D2, the OPD commits 8.4 percent of patrol time to administrative and out-of-service functions. This time is lower than other agencies of similar size. ICMA uses a benchmark of

14 percent of total time dedicated to out-of-service activities. These activities include administrative work, meal and personal periods, etc., and the OPD shows an efficient use of resources in this area. According to the data in Table D6, OPD patrol units on average take 23.2 minutes to handle a call for service. This figure is much lower than the benchmark time of about 30 minutes for a CFS, based on our experience. Also, the OPD, according to Table D7, dispatches 1.4 officers per CFS. The number of officers dispatched (like occupied time) varies by category of call, but is lower in the OPD than policing norms of about 1.6 officers per CFS. In other words, the OPD uses fewer officers to handle a CFS, and it takes less time than the average police response of similar size agencies.[5]

Similarly, according to Table D11, response time for CFS in Ontario averages around 10.0 minutes per call. This is lower than many communities of similar size and well below the generally accepted target response time of fifteen minutes per call.

Taken together, our analysis of occupied time, number of officers per call, and response time shows an extremely efficient deployment of patrol officers to CFS in Ontario.

Patrol Deployment and Staffing

Uniformed patrol is considered the "backbone" of American policing. Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that more than 95 percent of police departments in the U.S. in the same size category as the OPD provide uniformed patrol. Officers assigned to this important function are the most visible members of the department and command the largest share of resources committed by the department. Proper allocation of these resources is critical in order to have officers available to respond to calls for service and provide law enforcement services to the public.

Schedule and Staffing

The Ontario Police Department is divided into two teams referred to as the Blue Team and the Red Team. Each team has two Sergeants, one works days the other works swing. The two teams work opposite days of each other and rotate every 28 days. The schedule will show that one team will work Monday through Thursday working 10-hour shifts (40 total hours). The other team will work Friday-Sunday working 12.5-hour shifts (37.5 total hours). The team working 12.5 hour shifts will owe the city 10 hours of time at the end of the 28-day cycle. Because of the 10 hours owed, the department dedicates the 10 hours as a training day, which gives the officers additional training they would not normally receive and is at no cost to the city. Each team attends this training every other month in accordance with a 28-day cycle. This schedule has been determined by the collective bargaining agreement and any changes would need to be determined through this process in negotiations with the employee representative group.

There are several notable disadvantages of the patrol schedule in place in the OPD.

[5] ICMA benchmarks are derived from data analyses of police agencies similar to the OPD.

Examination of the shift schedule indicates that supervisory coverage in not provided around the clock. During the weekdays, the Blue and Red Team supervisors only cover 20 hours and on most days overlap their shifts, which result in even fewer hours of supervisory coverage per day.

The current shift configuration also requires that teams switch their days off every 28 days. The shift plan requires that one team works Monday through Thursday for a 28-day period and then Friday through Sunday the next 28-day period. The transition from one period to the next requires that one team must work seven consecutive days, ending with a series of three 12-hour shifts. This arrangement undoubtedly creates conditions of substantial fatigue for the officers working these extended hours. It is very favorable for the other side of the shift schedule, which experiences seven days off in a row, but the fatigue factor for the officers subjected to a schedule of seven consecutive days on is problematic. Fatigue is associated with poor judgment and decision making, poor motor reflexes and coordination, and poor physical and emotional responses to stress. Officers driving, dealing with complex social problems, and potentially using deadly force in these fatigued conditions are surely challenged. The shift change patterns from weekdays to weekends present in the OPD should be revisited.

The available literature on shift length provides no definitive conclusions on an appropriate shift length. A recent study published by the Police Foundation examined 8-hour, 10-hour, and 12-hour shifts and found positive and negative characteristics associated with all three options.[6] ICMA contends that the length of the shift is secondary to the application of that shift to meet service demands.

The 10-hour shift poses advantages and disadvantages to both 8- and 12-hour shifts. On the positive side, research indicates that officers working 10-hour shifts enjoy more and better sleep, and have greater alertness on-duty. From an operational perspective, implementing a 10-hour shift can have advantages, but also serious disadvantages if designed the wrong way. Because 10 is not a factor of 24, there will always be a surplus of officer-hours when a 10-hour shift is deployed. The key to efficiency is leveraging these surplus hours in a way that meets demand. Simply adding two hours to an eight hour day is the worst possible outcome and is extremely wasteful. Ten-hour shifts are most efficient when four start times are used, and the start and end times are staggered, thus staffing more officers when the demand is highest and fewer officers when the demand for services wanes. In general, this involves two pairs of 10-hour shifts that work in conjunction with one another. The product is two 20-hour blocks of time that can be rotated to meet service demands.

On the negative side, an inherent flaw in the 10-hour rotation, even the one that best maximizes resources, is a fracture in the unity of command and span of control of officers and supervisors. Unless there are a large number of officers and supervisors available to staff 10-hour shifts, there will always be a dilution in the unity of command. In other words, supervisors and officers will not work together every day, and officers will be supervised by different supervisors dictated by the rotation of the schedule. Additionally, 10-hour shifts generally require a sizeable complement of

[6] Karen L. Amendola, et al, *The Shift Length Experiment: What We Know about 8-, 10-, and 12-hour Shifts in Policing* (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2012).

officers on patrol to support operations. With only 14 officers, it does not seem likely that a schedule made of 10-hour shifts can be constructed for the OPD.

The 12-hour shift also poses advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, the 12-hour shift requires fewer work appearances for officers and supervisors. Presumably, fewer appearances translates into a higher quality of life away from work. From an operational perspective, the 12-hour shift results in a greater percentage of officers working on any given day, thus more officers to deploy toward crime, traffic, disorder, and community issues at any one time. This shift also affords a tight unity of command with supervisors and officers working together each shift. This promotes better supervision and better esprit de corps among employees.

On the negative side, a 12-hour shift configuration with four equally staffed squads results in a constant and fixed level of patrol staffing throughout the day. Service demands vary, peaking in the evening hours and waning in the early morning hours. With a constant supply of personnel and a variable demand for their services there will be a continual surplus and shortage of resources. Also, with a four squad configuration a "silo" effect is often created. The natural rotation of this shift configuration creates four separate squads that do not interact often, this creating personnel "silos." Similarly, it is difficult to communicate between the "silos" and between the squads and the executive management of the department. Fortunately, the OPD is aware of the potential breakdown in communication that can occur and has taken steps to foster communication between and with patrol squads.

In its totality, however, the patrol shift schedule in the OPD is inefficient. The best possible shift configuration appears to be the 12-hour shift model. Four equally staffed teams could be created to provide a constant supply of officers and supervisors, while simultaneously eliminating the negative elements of the current shift, and addressing operational needs more effectively. Consideration should be given by the OPD to working with the officers and sergeants to construct a shift schedule that more effectively addresses the needs of the department and the officers working it.

Deployment

Although some police administrators suggest that there are national standards for the number of officers per thousand residents that a department should employ, that is not the case. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) states that ready-made, universally applicable patrol staffing standards do not exist. Furthermore, ratios such as officers-per-thousand population are inappropriate to use as the basis for staffing decisions.

According to *Public Management* magazine, "A key resource is discretionary patrol time, or the time available for officers to make self-initiated stops, advise a victim in how to prevent the next crime, or call property owners, neighbors, or local agencies to report problems or request assistance. Understanding discretionary time, and how it is used, is vital. Yet most police departments do not

compile such data effectively. To be sure, this is not easy to do and, in some departments may require improvements in management information systems."[7]

Essentially, "discretionary time" on patrol is the amount of time available each day where officers are not committed to handling CFS and workload demands from the public. It is "discretionary" and intended to be used at the discretion of the officer to address problems in the community and be available in the event of emergencies. When there is no discretionary time, officers are entirely committed to service demands, do not get the chance to address other community problems that do not arise through 911, and are not available in times of serious emergency. The lack of discretionary time indicates a department is understaffed. Conversely, when there is too much discretionary time officers are idle. This is an indication that the department is overstaffed.

Staffing decisions, particularly for patrol, must be based on actual workload. Once the actual workload is determined the amount of discretionary time is determined and then staffing decisions can be made consistent with the department's policing philosophy and the community's ability to fund it. The OPD is a full-service police department, and its philosophy is to address essentially all requests for service in a community policing style. With this in mind it is necessary to look at workload to understand the impact of this style of policing in the context of community demand.

To understand *actual workload* (the time required to complete certain activities) it is critical to review total reported events within the context of how the events originated, such as through directed patrol, administrative tasks, officer-initiated activities, and citizen-initiated activities. Doing this analysis allows identification of activities that are really "calls" from those activities that are some other event.

Understanding the difference between the various types of police department events and the staffing implications is critical to determining deployment needs. This portion of the study looks at the total deployed hours of the police department with a comparison to the time being spent to currently provide services.

From an organizational standpoint, it is important to have uniformed patrol resources available at all times of the day to deal with issues such as proactive enforcement and community policing. Patrol is generally the most visible and most available resource in policing and the ability to harness this resource is critical for successful operations.

From an officer's standpoint, once a certain level of CFS activity is reached, the officer's focus shifts to a CFS-based reactionary mode. Once a threshold is reached, the patrol officer's mindset begins to shift from one that looks for ways to deal with crime and quality-of-life conditions in the community to one that continually prepares for the next call. After saturation, officers cease proactive policing and engage in a reactionary style of policing. The outlook becomes "Why act proactively when my actions are only going to be interrupted by a call?" Any uncommitted time is

[7] John Campbell, Joseph Brann, and David Williams, "Officer-per-Thousand Formulas and Other Policy Myths," *Public Management* 86 (March 2004): 22–27.

spent waiting for the next call. Sixty percent of time spent responding to calls for service is believed to be the saturation threshold.

The goal is to create a balance between the reactive and proactive capacity of the police department. Structuring the department with enough officers to handle CFS demands AND conduct proactive patrol and both proactive and reactive investigations, is in the best interests of the community. Over emphasis on one approach over the other leads to an inefficient deployment of resources and minimizes the department's ability to address service demands, crime, disorder, and other community concerns. In order to explore the balance between these competing goals, ICMA employs the "Rule of 60." This is a two-part benchmark that consists of balancing the allocation and deployment of sworn officers in the department. Part one of this rule pertains to allocation, and part two of this rule pertains to deployment.

Rule of 60 – Part 1

According to the OPD Organizational Chart dated 11/26/2013, patrol in the OPD is staffed by four sergeants and 14 police officers assigned to a CFS response capacity. These 18 of the 21 sworn officers represent 86 percent of the sworn officers in the OPD.

According to these statistics, the OPD does not adhere to the first component of the "Rule of 60," that is, substantially more than 60 percent of the total sworn force is dedicated to patrol operations. The OPD is very heavily invested in patrol operations and not invested enough in other critical aspects of policing. The benchmark in this area is not a "hard-and-fast" one that demands strict interpretation. In smaller departments, patrol operations consume a greater percentage of the overall personnel allocation, thus percentages greater than 60 are expected. At 86 percent, however, the OPD has no other capacity than patrol operations, and consideration should be given to balancing the department more appropriately to contend with other realities of police operations.

Rule of 60 – Part 2

The second part of the "Rule of 60" examines workload and discretionary time and suggests that no more than 60 percent of time should be committed to calls for service. In other words, ICMA suggests that no more than 60 percent of available patrol officer time be spent responding to the service demands of the community. The remaining 40 percent of the time is the "discretionary time" for officers to be available to address community problems and be available for serious emergencies. This Rule of 60 for patrol deployment does not mean the remaining 40 percent of time is downtime or break time. It is simply a reflection of the point at which patrol officer time is "saturated" by CFS.

This ratio of dedicated time compared to discretionary time is referred to as the "Saturation Index" (SI). It is ICMA's contention that patrol staffing is optimally deployed when the SI is in the 60 percent range. An SI greater than 60 percent indicates that the patrol manpower is largely reactive, and overburdened with CFS and workload demands. An SI of somewhat less than 60 percent indicates that patrol manpower is optimally staffed. SI levels much lower than 60 percent, however, indicate patrol resources that are underutilized, and signals an opportunity for a reduction in patrol resources or reallocation of police personnel.

Departments must be cautious in interpreting the SI too narrowly. For example, one should not conclude that SI can never exceed 60 percent at any time during the day, or that in any given hour no more than 60 percent of any officer's time be committed to CFS. The SI at 60 percent is intended to be a benchmark to evaluate overall service demands on patrol staffing. When SI levels exceed 60 percent for substantial periods of a given shift, or at isolated and specific times during the day, then decisions should be made to reallocate or realign personnel to reduce the SI to levels below 60. Lastly, this is not a hard-and-fast rule, but a benchmark to be used in evaluating staffing decisions.

The ICMA data analysis in the second part of this report provides a rich overview of CFS and staffing demands experienced by the OPD. The analysis here looks specifically at patrol deployment and how to maximize the personnel resources of the OPD to meet the demands of calls for service while also engaging in proactive policing to combat crime, disorder, and traffic issues in the community.

Figures 3 through 10 represent workload, staffing, and the "saturation" of patrol resources in the OPD during the two seasons on which we focused. By "saturation" we mean the amount of time officers spend on patrol handling service demands from the community. In other words, how much of the day is "saturated" with workload demands. This "saturation" is the comparison of workload with available manpower over the course of an average day during the months selected.

The figures represent the manpower and demand during weekdays and weekends during the months of August 2012 and February 2013. Examination of these figures permits exploration of the second part of the Rule of 60. Again, the Rule of 60 examines the relationship between total work and total patrol, and to comply with this rule, total work should be less than 60 percent of total patrol.

FIGURE 3: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Winter[8]



FIGURE 4: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekdays, Winter



[8] The calculation of personnel deployment does not adjust for "lost" time due to vacation, sick, court, etc. The data presented here represents "actual" headcount for personnel, which permits the exploration of "actual" staffing numbers to model the workload and staffing models. In other words, the models use deployment data on officers that actually show up for work and not the number assigned for that day/tour. Therefore, no adjustment for "lost" time is required. The end result permits an evaluation of these actual headcounts with the actual workload experienced by the officers.

Workload vs. Deployment – Weekdays – Winter

Avg. Workload:	0.7 officers per hour
Avg. % Deployed (SI):	19 percent
Peak SI:	58 percent
Peak SI Time:	11:00 a.m.

Figures 3 and 4 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekdays in winter 2013. As the figures indicate, the SI increases dramatically during the morning, reaching its height at around noon when it approaches the 60 percent threshold. After noon, workload demands taper off throughout the day. The OPD has the fewest officers assigned to work during the busiest times of the day, and the most officers assigned to work at the slowest times. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 5 percent at 6:30 a.m. to a high of 58 percent at 11:00 a.m., with a daily average of 19 percent.

Several observations can be made based on these figures:

- On average the OPD has an over-abundance of resources assigned to patrol to handle the workload. At 19 percent saturation rate during this period, patrol officers easily meet demand and are substantially below the 60 percent threshold at most times.
- There is a large amount of administrative time assigned during the weekdays between 7:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.
- There are not enough officers assigned mid-day to handle the service demands
- Police-initiated activity is extremely low after 1:00 a.m.
- There are too many officers assigned to the evening and nights relative to the workload demands confronting the department. Figure 3 shows that two times as many officers are assigned to the evening and night-time hours even as workload demands diminish.
- It appears that the 10-hour shifts deployed during the weekdays do not "stretch" the shifts appropriately to meet the demand.
- An important consideration must be made evaluating these data. Officers on patrol in the OPD are also required to conduct follow-up investigations on criminal cases. Anecdotal information and observation of patrol activities indicate that the time spent on this activity is not reflected in the workload calculations in these figures. During investigations officers do not "call out" of the dispatch system, which essentially shows them available while they are conducting the investigation. This artificially undercounts their available time. Recommendations in this report call for these investigations to be conducted by a dedicated unit, thus relieving patrol officers of this responsibility. Therefore, the data presented here appropriately illustrate the workload demands on patrol going forward.

FIGURE 5: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Winter



FIGURE 6: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekends, Winter



Workload v. Deployment – Weekends – Winter

Avg. Workload:	0.5 officers per hour
Avg. % Deployed (SI):	17 percent
Peak SI:	42 percent
Peak SI Time:	7:15 p.m.

Figures 5 and 6 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekends in winter 2013. As the figures indicate, the SI never exceeds the 60 percent threshold. The SI ranges from a low of under 10 percent at various times between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., and a high of 42 percent at 7:15 p.m., with a daily average of 17 percent.

There are several distinct features of these figures that warrant discussion. During the weekends, OPD patrol personnel are divided more equally into teams, with half the team working 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and the other half working 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. This can be seen graphically in Figure 5, where there is very little fluctuation in the green area that represents patrol staffing. It appears that approximately three officers are assigned throughout the day to handle service demands from the community. Also, the saturation index does not experience the rapid spike and recession that appears during the weekday time periods. This indicates that a uniform contingent of personnel resources better addresses the operational demands placed on the department. Instead of having the hybrid 12-hour and 10-hour shift configuration, the OPD would be better off with an all 12-hour shift configuration. Since the weekend deployment and saturation index figures show substantially better use of patrol resources, the OPD should consider using this deployment schedule throughout the week and not just on weekends. The result would be better deployment during the week and continued effective deployment on the weekends.

FIGURE 7: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Summer



FIGURE 8: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekdays, Summer



Workload v. Deployment – Weekdays – Winter

Avg. Workload:	0.7 officers per hour
Avg. % Deployed (SI):	21 percent
Peak SI:	46 percent
Peak SI Time:	12:00 p.m.

Figures 7 and 8 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekdays in summer 2013. As the figures indicate, the SI never exceeds the 60 percent threshold. The SI ranges from a low of under

10 percent between 4:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., to a high of 46 percent at 12:00 p.m., with a daily average of 21 percent.

FIGURE 9: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Summer



FIGURE 10: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekends, Summer



Workload v. Deployment – Weekends – Summer

Avg. Workload:	0.7 officers per hour
Avg. % Deployed (SI):	20 percent
Peak SI:	55 percent
Peak SI Time:	1:30 p.m.

Figures 9 and 10 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekends in summer 2013. Again, the workload never exceeds the 60 percent threshold. The SI ranges from a low of below 0 percent at 6:30 a.m. to a high of 55 percent at 1:30 p.m., with a daily average of 20 percent.

In Figures 4, 6, 8, and 10, the patrol resources available are denoted by the dashed green line at the top. The 100 percent value indicates the total police officer hours available during the 24-hour period. This amount varies during the day consistent with the staffing of the shifts, but at any given hour the total amount of available manpower will equal 100.

The red dashed line fixed at the 60 percent level represents the saturation index (SI). As discussed above, this is the point at which patrol resources become largely reactive as CFS and workload demands consume a larger and larger portion of available time. The solid black line represents total workload experienced by the OPD.

Looking at the comparisons of the green, red, and black lines in the SI figures, and comparing workload to available staffing, the data indicate that workload demands in Ontario are easily met by the resources available. The busiest times of the day are between 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., with another spike after midnight on the weekends. The staffing of the blue and red teams, and the rotation of these teams, indicate that the current staffing levels are appropriate to meet the demand. Although it appears that the patrol function in the OPD has enough resources to meet demand, the shifts are configured in such a way that leads to inefficiencies. The weekday 10-hour shifts need to be reconfigured, or abandoned entirely.

Recommendation:

- Create a working committee to explore the reconfiguration of patrol shifts.
- Create the position of operations commander, at the rank of captain, to coordinate patrol and investigations. This position would be responsible for creating the strategic plans for the department and ensuring these plans are implemented aggressively, deploying both reactive and proactive patrol and investigative tactics.

Traffic

The OPD does not staff a dedicated traffic safety unit, as available personnel resources do not allow for the assignment of a free-standing traffic unit. However, the data presented in Table 6 indicate that the department should more closely examine traffic crashes and traffic enforcement in the community. According to Table 6, there has been a 23 percent increase in traffic accidents and a 39 percent increase in injuries related to traffic accidents since 2011. This is too short of a period to identify any specific trends; however, there is enough evidence to warrant closer attention. In addition, the number of traffic citations decreased over the same period by approximately 54 percent. The combination of the increase in accidents and injuries and the decrease in enforcement is a situation that needs attention.

TABLE 6: Traffic Accident/Enforcement 2011-2013

Category	2013	2012	2011
Traffic Accidents	274	241	220
Injuries in Traffic Accidents	64	68	46
Fatalities	0	0	2
Traffic Citations	854	1,296	1,869

Similar to the approach toward crime reduction (discussed below in the section, Building a Culture of Performance) the OPD should consider taking a strategic approach to traffic safety. Adopting a strategic approach requires engaging the entire department in this effort to make the overall traffic safety plan of the OPD more effective. The goal of traffic enforcement is to reduce the incidents of traffic accidents, reduce traffic injuries, and improve the movement of traffic. The goal should not be to issue tickets and make arrests. It is not necessary to establish a distinct unit to implement traffic safety programs, however, one person must be responsible for coordinating this effort and establishing the plan and the priorities for the officers to work on.

In order to reduce traffic accidents it is necessary to determine when, where, and why they are happening, and then use enforcement to specifically address the causes of accidents at critical locations. In addition to *enforcement*, the OPD must focus on *education* programs targeting at-risk drivers. Furthermore, the OPD must support *engineering* efforts to analyze problem locations to determine if roadway characteristics are contributing to accidents and/or if different or new signage might be necessary. Collectively, these efforts are known as the three "E's" of traffic safety. They work best via a coordinated approach that is undertaken through deliberate strategic planning.

The enforcement efforts of the patrol officers must be focused on the times, places, and offenses that are the greatest contributors to traffic accidents, injuries, and traffic congestion. These efforts can then be tracked and the traffic incidents monitored to determine if these efforts are working. Efforts can then be readjusted (or not) based upon results (an increase or decrease in accidents).

Accountability is another essential component this process. Someone in the OPD needs to be accountable for two major parts of the traffic reduction plan: 1) ensuring that enforcement efforts are directed properly (the right level of enforcement aimed at the right offenses, times, and locations), and 2) ensuring that the other two E's (engineering and education) are being addressed. The OPD must work with the traffic department to inspect and evaluate problematic intersections. Additionally, public education campaigns targeting at-risk drivers need to be designed and implemented, and someone must be the "quarterback" of these efforts.

Again, the product of this strategic planning process is a written plan. In this case a "Traffic Reduction Plan" that incorporates a thorough analysis of the problem, a coordinated plan involving the three "E's," identification of a coordinator, and a prescribed method of follow-up and periodic review to ensure the plan is working. In light of reduced resources in the OPD, this approach ensures that the efforts of the officers are targeted on problems and not left to chance.

Under this approach, it is recommended that the operations commander would become responsible for the overall traffic safety plan of the OPD. In addition, consideration should be given to designating one officer in each patrol team during the shift to act as the traffic safety officer. Instead of a fixed assignment to a unit, officers could share the responsibility of traffic enforcement on a day-to-day basis as conditions dictate. Armed with the right traffic intelligence, officers could be directed each shift to focus enforcement efforts at problematic locations and report their activity to the operations commander. Furthermore, the School Resource Officers (SROs) could be instrumental at delivering traffic safety education to students in the high school and middle school, as well as their parents.

Recommendation:

- Develop a traffic safety strategy integrating the three E's of traffic safety.
- Assign officers on patrol to act as traffic safety officers as needed.
- Affix responsibility and accountability with execution of the traffic safety strategy with the operations coordinator.

Technology on Patrol

The OPD is one of the least technologically sophisticated departments that ICMA has evaluated. Department vehicles lack the deployment of commonly used technology for police patrol.

Marked vehicles lack mobile digital terminals (MDTs) for communications, report writing, and data analysis. Officers take handwritten notes on all incidents and then return to the station house to enter the information into the records management system.

Officers prepare traffic citations by hand and do not rely on e-ticket printers and license readers commonly used in U.S. law enforcement.

Fixed radar is not deployed in the vehicles and officers must sign out handheld radar guns for speed enforcement.

AR-15 rifles are assigned to each vehicle. It is recommended that these weapons be removed each shift from the vehicles and secured in the station house when not in use. The practice of removing and returning the weapons regularly can familiarize officers with the practice, thus improving their ability to retrieve the weapon quickly in a time of emergency.

In-car video is deployed in patrol vehicles. However, officers must manually retrieve the stick-drive to store the information on the central server. The preferred method of data retrieval and storage is an automatic upload of the information from the vehicle to the server without direct intervention of the officer.

The OPD does not use automatic license plate readers (LPRs). Recent research has shown that license plate readers are very effective tools for apprehending auto thieves and recovering stolen

vehicles. An LPR costs around $20,000 to $25,000 per device, but can check license plates about ten times faster than an officer manually checking license plates. Their use can result in double the number of arrests and recoveries of stolen vehicles.[9] Agencies that employ LPR technology report that over the next five years they plan on increasing the deployment of LPRs to equip approximately 25 percent of their patrol cars. It is strongly recommended that the OPD implement this technology and install an LPR in at least one marked patrol car.

The department has an automated external defibrillator (AED) located in the police station, but police vehicles are not equipped with this device. AEDs are designed to be simple to use for first responders, and their use is taught in many first aid, first responder, and basic life support (BLS)-level CPR classes. The deployment of AEDs in marked police vehicles would greatly enhance the lifesaving capabilities of the department. These inexpensive (less than $2,000 each unit) and easy-to-use devices would be a tremendous asset to the OPD and their purchase and deployment is strongly recommended.

This section is not intended to be a "shopping list" for the department. It is intended to point out the deficiencies in technology and to identify commonly used technology on patrol in U.S. law enforcement. It is recommended that the department form a committee to identify the technological needs for patrol, create a plan for implementation, and identify the grant funding that potentially exists to support the acquisition, installation, and use of this equipment.

Recommendation:

- Empanel a technology committee to identify and recommend the acquisition of appropriate technology for all department needs.

School Resource Officers (SROs)

Ontario currently maintains two School Resource Officers, or SROs; one each at Ontario High School and Ontario Middle School. While costs associated with the SROs resides within the OPD budget, the Ontario School District, via contract, reimburses the city of Ontario for those hours the SROs are deployed at the schools.

Once selected for assignment, an SRO will remain in that position for three to four years. Per current practice, the SRO will conduct on-campus investigations and make arrests on school grounds. One of the principal benefits to the SRO program, aside from a security presence, is in the building of sustainable relationships with youth and the greater school community. These relationships, which can be difficult to attain and remain fragile in nature, can be adversely affected when the SRO moves into a role of an adversary—as when the SRO makes an arrest on campus. The OPD should reexamine current practice and consider moving the practice of conducting on-campus investigations and making arrests to patrol or detectives, should a detective unit be established.

[9] Police Executive Research Forum study of LPR effectiveness in the Mesa, Arizona, Police Department.

Obviously, this is not to suggest that the SRO should not intervene in an emergency, rather, that the role of the SRO be viewed in a different context than its current form.

SROs currently assigned do not submit monthly reports or maintain daily activity logs. ICMA recommends that both of these be initiated, with the monthly reports forwarded to the chief of police.

Recommendations:

- Evaluate the current role of the SROs as it relates to conducting investigations and making on-campus arrests.
- Require the maintenance of daily activity logs by the SROs and the submission of a monthly report to the chief of police.

Code Enforcement Officer

The code enforcement officer provides a multitude of services, including nuisance abatement, graffiti abatement, animal control, and parking enforcement. The current code enforcement officer has received advanced training and certifications and is expected to receive the highest certification, Certified Code Enforcement Professional, by July 31, 2014. Currently, the code enforcement officer works 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Additionally, the code enforcement officer volunteers as a chairperson of the OPD's 'Fish with a Cop' program and serves as the elected public relations officer of the Oregon Code Enforcement Association.

When dealing with overgrown weeds, garbage, and the like, the code enforcement officer will hand deliver or mail via certified mail a notice of violation to the owner or party responsible for the property in question, advising that violations must be corrected with ten days. Failure to correct the violations results in a $300 citation being issued to the owner or responsible party.

Under the animal control function, the officer will deal with a wide array of animal-related issues including stray dogs and vicious animals. A variety of different size cage type traps are maintained for the humane capture of nuisance animals.

Parking enforcement also falls to this officer, including handling incidents involving abandoned cars. An OPD case number is drawn for each abandoned vehicle encountered.

Finally, graffiti abatement is coordinated through the code enforcement officer. While the city can be thankful to have the support of a volunteer to assist when available with graffiti removal, the code enforcement officer will cover over gang-related and profane graffiti as soon as it is discovered. It may be worthwhile to equip other selected city-owned vehicles with some minimal equipment to cover graffiti as it is discovered.

The overall workload of the code enforcement officer exceeds the ability of the single officer to effectively manage. Currently, the officer is carrying 135 cases—an unmanageable number. ICMA recommends that code enforcement staffing be increased by an additional half-time employee.

Recommendations:

- Explore the feasibility of equipping other city-owned vehicles with equipment to combat graffiti.
- Increase staffing in code enforcement by one half-time employee.

Special Teams

The OPD does not maintain any formalized special teams or units. Special teams can include an Emergency Response Team; Traffic or Accident Team; Crisis Intervention Team; K9; Domestic Violence Team; or Community Outreach, to name a few.

Criminal Investigations

The Ontario Police Department does not currently maintain any dedicated detective personnel or criminal investigations unit. Additionally, there is no single supervisor designated to supervise and coordinate the efforts of all patrol officers conducting extended investigations or follow-ups. Officers will coordinate, to whatever degree possible, investigative efforts bearing similar offender characteristics or modus operandi. All investigations maintained in-house by the OPD are investigated by patrol officers. ICMA maintains that this organizational structure is contrary to best practices, marginalizes patrol effectiveness and agility, and facilitates recidivism as investigative resources are necessarily limited by the ongoing demands placed upon patrol. It is not reasonable to assume that patrol officers are either equipped or available to conduct criminal investigations in a manner that would increase clearance rates and thus appreciably reduce crime. OPD staffing should be increased to provide at least three full-time detectives to investigate crimes within Ontario city limits. These detectives should not be affiliated with any task force. Additionally, a revised Table of Organization, described elsewhere in this document, would provide defined supervision for these detectives and better coordination of effort between patrol, detectives, and any OPD personnel assigned to a task force or specialized unit external to the OPD.

The three detectives should receive advanced training in investigative techniques including general principles of investigation, interview and interrogation, crime scene processing, and the collection and preservation of evidence. OPD should then provide the necessary equipment for these detectives to carry out their duties.

Under current practice, OPD assigns a patrol officer to respond to a reported crime. Typically, that officer will remain as the primary investigating officer. The department does have one patrol officer with expertise in computer-related crime, but the officer does not have any formal certifications. There is also one officer certified as a drug recognition expert, or DRE. Reporting thresholds, such as the value of a stolen item, are not used in determining whether an incident will receive additional investigation.

At the scene, the investigating officer bears general responsibility for processing the scene and photographing and collecting evidence. The assigned officer will dust for fingerprints, collect blood evidence and the like while other officers assist in conducting interviews and sometimes conducting a “neighborhood canvass” for information.

Should OPD respond to a major crime, such as a homicide, or a very large crime scene that requires the deployment of resources or staff beyond the immediate capability of OPD, the Oregon State Police (OSP) are requested to respond. OPD can elect to request that the OSP Crime Lab Field Office in Pendleton respond to process the scene for evidence with OPD retaining the primary investigations role or OPD can essentially turn the case over to the OSP for investigation. Relinquishing control of an investigation to OSP is not a frequent occurrence. Similarly, requesting the services of the OSP Crime Lab Field Office, while bringing substantial resources, must also acknowledge a response time to Ontario of no less than three and one-half hours. This can present

challenges to maintaining the integrity of a crime scene, particularly one situated outdoors or in an area that would mean substantial local disruption.

OPD does not use any standardized "solvability factors" in determining which cases would benefit from immediate further investigation or be given higher investigative priority based on an increased likelihood of apprehending the persons responsible. Solvability factors are essentially a checklist of items, the presence of which could be viewed as an investigative "lead." As the number of solvability factors present increases so does the likelihood of an apprehension. Cases where a suspect has been identified, or a suspect appears readily identifiable, should normally be given priority. While solvability factors can be tailored to fit the needs of an individual police agency, most include:

- Is there a witness to the crime?
- Is there knowledge of a suspect's name?
- Is there knowledge of where a suspect may be located?
- Is there a description of a suspect?
- Has property with unique identifying characteristics, serial numbers, marks, etc. been taken?
- Is there a modus operandi?
- Is there significant physical evidence?
- Are there positive results obtained from the physical evidence?
- Is there a suspect vehicle description?
- Is there reasonable belief that additional investigative efforts may result in an arrest?

While it may be suggested that such information should be routinely included in any competently prepared police report, it is when these factors are quantified independent of a narrative that their utility comes into focus. OPD would be well-served by including solvability factors into the normal information gathering routine.

Further, OPD should make every effort to conduct a thorough area or neighborhood canvass when investigating a crime such as a burglary, and documenting that the canvass was completed. Consideration should be given to distributing "canvass cards" that could be left at area homes found unoccupied at the time of the canvass. The cards, preprinted with wording asking for the assistance of the public in gathering information, would identify the type of crime being investigated, the date, and the investigating officer's contact information. The canvass cards, aside from ensuring that the request for information is effectively distributed, also serves as a notice to the residents of Ontario that the police are investigating, and further, may increase citizen vigilance in reporting suspicious activity. Cards can be printed in English on one side and Spanish on the other.

OPD, as does all of Malheur County law enforcement with the exception of the OSP, uses CMI 'JUSTICE' CAD/RMS software. CAD/RMS is principally administered by the Malheur County Sheriff's

Office (MCSO) but the microwave connectivity between OPD and the server located at MCSO lacks the speed to effectively transmit photos, videos, or other large files in a timely manner. As such, OPD retains these files in-house on a separate part of its own server, identified by case number. However, these files cannot be merged into the case folder on the JUSTICE software. Because of the connectivity issue, other law enforcement agencies in Malheur County do not have immediate access to photos and videos maintained by OPD. ICMA recommends that an appropriate high-speed data connection, such as fiber optic, be established between OPD and MCSO; ideally, this connection would have redundancy in the event of a failure of the primary connection. ICMA also recommends that a redundant server be established at OPD in the event of a server crash at MCSO.

The CMI software was described as "very basic," with no crime mapping capability. The software platform is dated, its agility in retrieving data very limited, and its ability to generate reports in a contemporary and useful format is nearly nonexistent. The multiple generation of events related to a single incident, such as occurs when numerous stolen items are entered under a burglary, can lead to unintentional misreading of data and incorrect reporting of statistics. In other words, if one were to look strictly at the number of entries under burglary incidents without manually excluding the duplicate entries of property related to the initial incident, a person could be lead to believe that there were many more burglaries than had actually occurred. The software requires more manual intervention than ought to occur. ICMA recommends that the JUSTICE system be upgraded to a more useful level or abandoned in favor of software fitting the needs of OPD and other user agencies.

OPD does not maintain physical "case files," such as manila folders. All files are in electronic format. This is a good practice and allows for greater security and access to appropriate persons. However, it must be viewed as limited given the connectivity issues previously described.

Case management in a formal sense does not occur. Again, the JUSTICE system presents challenges on this front. As a case is followed up, it receives an 'F' designation in JUSTICE. The 'scratchpad' function serves as a useful function to give officers and supervisors status updates on cases. However, supervisors and officers are still required to manually query cases for status. There is no ability to set reminders alerting a supervisor or an officer that a follow-up has exceeded set parameters for status updates. Once leads have been exhausted an officer can request permission to suspend an investigation, an acceptable tool of case management. JUSTICE, however, requires that the case receive a "reviewed" status carrying an 'R' designation, effectively moving the file into an archive with all other cases considered closed. Usually a note is made to the scratch pad that the case has been suspended. It is important to understand that a suspended case and a closed case are not the same. It is not uncommon for suspended cases to be reopened as new information is received. Using the JUSTICE system, a suspended case must be retrieved, reclassified back to 'F' and assigned to an officer. There is no method to retrieve all suspended investigations to ensure that all cases with similar fact patterns, modus operandi, etc. are checked against any new information. At the same time, OPD should be tracking individual officer performance as it relates to case follow-up. Officers carrying an excessive number of cases for follow-up cannot be expected to be conducting effective investigations, particularly without any available support from detectives. Supervisors

should be monitoring follow-ups to relieve overburdened officers and ensure that Ontario residents are receiving timely and competent follow-up to assigned cases.

As of the time of ICMA site visit, OPD had approximately 270 cases being carried for follow-up, or an average of approximately 15 per patrol officer. This is a caseload typical of a full time detective—not a patrol officer who is expected to maintain an ability to fulfill patrol obligations. Because of this, clearance rates—generally used as a performance benchmark—are not where they should be. OPD does not currently track clearance rates, which are represented as a percentage of criminal arrests for the commission of specific offenses against the number of those offenses recorded. The clearance rates can then be tracked over time. Increased clearance rates and reduced numbers of specific offenses related to that clearance rate would indicate that police resources are being used effectively. Further, measuring OPD's clearance rates against those of communities within its demographic, or the county as a whole, or the state as a whole can illuminate the degree to which Ontario is performing.

As a baseline measurement, ICMA took three Index Crime offenses, burglary, aggravated assault, and larceny. Then, using OPD 2013 data, ICMA computed the following: OPD investigated 118 burglaries, arresting 8 offenders. This provides a clearance rate of 6.8 percent. Similarly, OPD reported 46 aggravated assaults in 2013, accompanied by 24 arrests, for a clearance rate of 52.2 percent. Larcenies totaled 694 with 168 arrests for a clearance rate of 24.2 percent.

The latest available national data reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation is for calendar year 2012 and is accessed under *Crime in the United States* at www.fbi.gov. Among many other things, the report categorizes clearance rates in two distinct categories: population grouping and by region. For the purposes of the report, Ontario falls within the 10,000 to 24,999 population group and the Western Pacific region. Table 7 offers a comparison of OPD clearance rates against the population group and regional statistics.

TABLE 7: Clearance Rates

Crime	OPD (2013)	10,000-24,999 (2012)	Western Pacific (2012)
Burglary	6.8%	15.4%	11.8%
Aggravated Assault	52.2%	62.0%	54.6%
Larceny	24.2%	28.2%	16.5%

*Source: *OPD 2013 Annual Report* and *Crime in the United States, 2012*

OPD currently publishes monthly and annual reports detailing totals of specific offenses, services provided, and total arrests. These are reports of 'outputs,' or simply the number of times something occurred. A far more useful measure would be a quarterly and annual report providing clearance rates for any number of offenses—at a minimum, OPD should measure clearance rates for each of the seven "index crimes" and any other categories that either the city of Ontario or the OPD has identified as negatively impacting the quality of life for the residents of Ontario. For this to occur

OPD would need to track arrests by offense to obtain the data necessary for clearance rate computations. Acknowledging the challenges posed by the limitations of the JUSTICE software, there may need to be manual data collection and computations; this is possible, as the ICMA site visit team identified talented and committed staff, both sworn and civilian, who are more than up to the task.

Once clearance rates are obtained they can be compared against any number of categories, peer groups, or increases and decreases in specific offenses to measure OPD's effectiveness in combatting crime.

These data should be viewed as one component of a needed crime analysis function. Data and causal factors related to locations requiring frequent police response, or a particular demographic group needing police services at an inordinate level, can be examined to identify methods by which measures short of a police response can be deployed or where police resources can be more effectively deployed. These can include 'target hardening' to reduce frequent incidents of theft; better lighting or environmental improvements to combat vandalism or graffiti; or programs for the disadvantaged.

Finally, there is a lack of regularly scheduled information and intelligence sharing meetings—effective exchanges of information relating to a collaborative regional effort in combatting crimes affecting the entire region. While there are scheduled meetings of the Law Enforcement Department Heads; Local Public Safety Coordination Council (mandated by Oregon law); and the Mental Health Multidiscipline Council, there ought to be scheduled meetings or publications pertaining to crime trends, potential suspects, gang activity, and the like. Too often, law enforcement will assert such information is exchanged through normal work channels; however, a formalized structure will offer superior benefits. OPD should explore spearheading such an effort. The addition of detectives and a coordinating supervisor to the OPD Table of Organization, coupled with the talents of the existing civilian staff, would make this initiative achievable.

Recommendations:

- Create a Criminal Investigations Unit of three properly trained, properly equipped detectives (one detective supervisor and two case detectives).
- A revised Table of Organization should provide for direct supervision of the detectives and a coordination of OPD's investigative efforts.
- OPD should implement the use of solvability factors into the criminal investigation process to assist in prioritizing investigations.
- An effective neighborhood canvass should be required in criminal investigations and the use of 'canvass cards' ought to be considered.
- The shortcomings of the JUSTICE software need to be addressed. ICMA recommends a committee of relevant stakeholders be formed to explore options and offer solutions.

- High-speed connectivity and redundancy should be established between OPD and the MCSO to facilitate and protect the effective exchange of information between user agencies.
- An effective case management protocol needs to be implemented to prioritize investigations, monitor case progress, and ensure effective distribution of workload.
- Clearance rates for selected offense categories should be tracked and compared on a quarterly and annual basis as a performance management tool.
- A crimes analysis function needs to be formalized and implemented.
- A structured information sharing arrangement among law enforcement agencies in the region should be established at the investigator level.
- Add a half-time civilian staff position to the investigations unit to assist with case management, crime analysis, and criminal intelligence.

High-Desert Task Force

OPD recently assigned a single officer, designated as a detective, to the High Desert Drug Task Force. This unit operates from a satellite office and while authorized at eight members, currently has six. Officers are assigned to the unit from the OPD; Malheur County Sheriff's Office; Payette, Idaho Police Department; Washington County, Idaho Sheriff's Office; Weiser Police Department; and the Payette County, Idaho Sheriff's Office. Officers assigned to the unit are "cross-sworn" as officers, giving them police powers in both Oregon and Idaho. The unit's work hours are flexible given the nature of the work performed.

Principally, the task force works drug investigations, stolen property, and other major crimes, assisting their respective jurisdictions as needed when additional resources are required. The task force works multiple cases simultaneously, working with and gaining information from informants. Should the task force successfully arrange for a purchase of narcotics or stolen property, a case number is generated. Task force efforts are coordinated with the DEA, ATF, and FBI.

One anomaly was noted in that there is no clearly identified commander of this task force. There is an 'informal' officer-in-charge (OIC) of the unit, but this ought to be amended to identify a specific person as OIC.

Given that the OPD joined this unit less than one month ago, there is no historical data regarding the activities of OPD personnel assigned to the unit. Given the existence of other crime-related data, though, it would appear this unit's work is worth supporting. As stated earlier, though, OPD should next focus on bringing a credible and dedicated criminal investigations unit into OPD operations.

Recommendations:

- Designate an officer-in-charge of the High Desert Drug Task Force.
- Require quarterly and annual reporting of the activities of the High Desert Drug task Force, along a performance measures model.

Administrative

Training

Currently, the OPD does not have an officer or supervisor designated to oversee the training function of the department. ICMA recommends that the new, proposed Table of Organization designate a supervisor as responsible for this function.

The state of Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards and Training, or DPSST, maintains mandatory training standards for an officer to maintain his or her certification. These mandatory areas of training include field sobriety; firearms; defensive tactics; Taser; pursuit policy and spike strip deployment; active shooter; and Emergency Vehicle Operator Course, or 'EVOC'; among others. In addition, supervisors are required to receive a minimum of thirty-six hours of management training every three years.

Firearms training, required once annually by the DPSST, occurs twice annually for the OPD. Given the high risk/high liability associated with the use of firearms, this is a prudent practice that ought to continue. The twice annual qualification includes the department-issued Glock .45 caliber sidearm and the AR15 .223 caliber rifle. The supervisor's vehicle is equipped with a 12-gauge "bean bag" less-than-lethal weapon.

Each OPD sergeant is responsible for ensuring that his "team" members receive required training and that training received is properly documented on the state of Oregon 'F6' form. The completed F6 forms are then forwarded to the DPSST so that proper 'credit hours' can be certified. Internal to the OPD, there is no standard policy regarding maintenance of records related to training and each sergeant uses their own "system." While there is no evidence of shortcomings in the maintenance of the records, and the records inspected were neatly arranged into a scanned folder on a computer, OPD cannot track training by individual officer absent a manual search. ICMA recommends that completed F6 forms be given to the civilian office manager and a training file be kept on each officer. Consideration ought to be given to obtaining or building a basic software module to track training that would also allow for the entire suite of training given to an individual officer to be easily retrieved.

An inspection of training records revealed the OPD to exceed mandated training requirements, a practice which ought to continue. Agencies seeking to reduce expenditures are ill-advised to target training absent a lack of any other alternatives. Proper training, aside from placing a professional police officer on the street equipped to handle the myriad problems police officers face daily, also serves as a prudent risk and liability avoidance mechanism, shielding officers from harm and municipalities from litigation brought about by inadequate training.

Recommendations:

- Designate a single supervisor for administrative responsibilities and who will oversee the training function as well as other critical areas of administration.

- Standardize recordkeeping pertaining to the training function, making it accessible for inspection by the chief of police.
- Acquire or design computerized tracking and management of training records, allowing for a complete training "file" to be kept on each officer. ICMA recommends this responsibility be shifted from the sergeants to the officer manager.

Internal Affairs

The Ontario Police Department subscribes to *Lexipol*, a California-based service that provides a complete package of state-specific police policies and procedures. *Lexipol* is continually updated so that a department can remain abreast of identified best practices, court decisions, and individual state mandates. While OPD reported some logistical issues with a newly updated version of *Lexipol*, it remains very satisfied with the product. Other documents governing the daily operations of the OPD are the current Collective Bargaining Agreement with the city of Ontario and city of Ontario Personnel Policy Manual, 2003 edition.

The OPD is not presently an accredited police agency (the vast majority of police agencies are not accredited) and while that may be identified as a long-term goal of the OPD administration, there remain other more pressing staff and resource issues that ought to take priority.

The OPD policy on personnel complaints, provided by *Lexipol*, is Ontario Police Department Policy 1020, last amended in October 2013. It is a comprehensive policy prescribing a specific course of action in accepting, investigating, and disposing of complaints made against an officer. The OPD does accept anonymous complaints and investigates each to the extent possible. This is a good practice.

OPD has received three to five complaints against officers in each of the last three years. Initial complaint intake usually occurs at the sergeant's level. Persons making a complaint can either fill out a 'Complaint or Commendation Form' or speak with a supervisor. The supervisor receiving the complaint can either handle it personally or advise the chief of police if the allegations being made are serious. Most complaints received involve a person's perception that they were treated with rudeness or in an unprofessional manner. These complaints can usually be resolved, to the complainant's satisfaction, by a sergeant. More serious complaints, or complaints where the complainant demands a formal investigation, are either handled by the chief of police or a supervisor designated by him. In rare instances, the chief may ask an outside agency to conduct the investigation.

Files of complaints and the investigations related thereto are maintained in the chief's office, filed by year. An inspection of these files showed investigations to be thorough, timely, and professionally done, with a written description of a finding and final disposition being sent to the complainant. The internal affairs function of the OPD appears well managed.

Fleet

The OPD maintains a fleet of fifteen vehicles. The primary patrol vehicle is the six cylinder Dodge Charger police vehicle. OPD maintains eight of these vehicles. The patrol supervisors operate a Chevrolet Tahoe. The balance of the fleet consists of four unmarked vehicles, one code enforcement vehicle, and one SUV used to transport graffiti removal equipment.

Vehicles are generally acquired through the state of Oregon bids. A local repair shop does upfitting of new vehicles and performs general and routine maintenance with the exception of tire repair and warranty work. While upfitting of police vehicles is usually done by specialists, OPD is able to have the local shop do the upfits at a favorable savings.

Patrol vehicles are assigned to two or three officers for their exclusive use during the patrol week. Assigning of vehicles is a sound practice that increases accountability and generally provides for a better maintained vehicle. Officers are required to inspect their assigned patrol vehicles at the start of and conclusion of the work week. Any maintenance issues are reported via email to both the officer's sergeant and the chief, either of whom will acknowledge receipt and arrange for necessary repairs or maintenance. Once the repair is completed, the chief enters same, including the cost, into the "fleet" module of the JUSTICE system. The chief then uses the repair history data to identify vehicles for replacement. An inspection of the repair history file did reveal evidence supporting its utility in identifying vehicles for replacement, as significant increases in repairs were identified on two vehicles for which replacement funding had been requested.

The current practices used by the OPD in fleet accountability are simple, straightforward, and sufficient.

Volunteer Service

The OPD presently has one volunteer, working each Tuesday and Thursday from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m., for the purpose of handling the "civilian fingerprinting" function, generally a part of any police operation. Persons needing to be fingerprinted for permit applications or special licenses can make an appointment through the volunteer to receive those services. An average of fifteen to twenty-four fingerprint cards are completed by this volunteer weekly, cards that formerly required a police officer to be taken off patrol to complete. This volunteer position, established in April 2013, is certainly an economical way of providing necessary services to the public and the OPD should be commended for initiating it.

The volunteer presently providing this service has a cheerful and helpful disposition, with a "glad-to-help-out" attitude. OPD would be well-served to advertise the success of this program and attempt to identify additional volunteer opportunities that would enhance operations and services.

Recommendation:

- Attempt to identify additional opportunities for volunteers to augment police services.

Office Manager

The OPD's office manager, while performing tasks typically associated with such a position, also provides an array of services and talents not normally found in an office manager. The current office manager previously served the city of Ontario as its computer network manager.

In addition to administering the OPD payroll, personnel files, data reports, coordinating purchases of office supplies, and posting press releases to the OPD website, the office manager also has responsibility for the OPD's JUSTICE systems, the telephone system, audio recording systems, the city's website, the OPD Communications Center infrastructure, security compliance related to NCIC/LETS, computer systems maintenance, and permit administration. The office manager also teaches at the city's "Traffic School" and is a certified car seat technician.

The communications center previously serving the city of Ontario emergency services, is in the process of a consolidation. The new consolidated, multi-agency communications center is housed at the Malheur County Sheriff's Office. Once the consolidation is completed, some 911-related responsibilities handled by the office manager will end and will be shifted to the newly consolidated center.

The office manager, with her considerable technology abilities, could assist Chief Alexander in tracking clearance rates, building quantifiable performance measures, and gathering data useful in furtherance of the department's mission and objectives.

The use of supplemental technology, such as Crystal Reports, coupled to the existing JUSTICE system, could be useful in compiling and collating information consistent with the recommendations contained in this report.

Recommendations:

- Provide training to the office manager in the fundamentals of effective law enforcement data reporting, including clearance rate tracking and building effective performance measures.
- Implement auxiliary software to supplement the JUSTICE system in collating and compiling effective data retrieval.

Police Facility

City of Ontario police operations are housed in the same building with city hall and Ontario Fire & Rescue. This is not an uncommon arrangement. One initial observation by ICMA personnel was the lack of any signage on the exterior of the building identifying it as the home of the Ontario Police Department. While "CITY HALL" and "ONTARIO FIRE RESCUE" are prominently displayed on the building, there is nothing to indicate police operations are housed there, as well. Appropriate signage should be installed identifying it as Ontario Police Headquarters.

This shared facility poses some very significant security challenges. Shared municipal facilities are not uncommon; however, failing to segregate and secure police operations from other functions contained within the building is ill-advised. Currently, persons visiting city hall on business can gain access to unsecured areas of the police space and which house sensitive police information, police equipment, and persons taken into custody. Further, confidential communications, either by radio, between officers, between officers and citizens, or even officers and persons taken into custody, are easily overheard by nonpolice staff. A combative prisoner or armed subject poses unnecessary risk to visitors to city hall and nonpolice city employees.

Access through the secure rear door of the facility is accomplished by entering a code on a keypad—a code that could easily be obtained by anyone intent on obtaining it through surveillance. Better access control, such as electronic fob access, should be installed.

While it is likely that a lack of proper work space and storage affects not only the police department, the police department needs must be addressed. While all city of Ontario staff should be commended for a collective willingness to work around the challenges posed by the current facility, the risks associated with it cannot be ignored.

The designated police space is clearly inadequate, outdated, and not up to the task of facilitating the operations of the Ontario Police Department. It provides no logical flow and no task-oriented arrangement. A report room also serves as a break room where meals are taken. Equipment is stored and mounted throughout the space. Work space remains in a constant state of disruption as staff and visitors move about and through space occupied and being used by others. This lack of space and security led to the moving of property and evidence to another building, further fragmenting operations. The officers' locker room is also housed in the same facility as property and evidence. Inspection of the locker room space revealed repurposed lockers, inadequate in size, in a cramped space lacking adequate ventilation or facilities.

The temporary holding area for detainees is wholly inadequate and lacking any modern security or surveillance monitoring capability.

ICMA recommends that the city of Ontario engage the services of a public safety architect or professional firm to conduct a space needs assessment of the Ontario Police Department. A proper space needs assessment should include a review of operations and service demands, interviews with staff, an analysis of Ontario demographics and potential for future population growth, and a similar analysis of future staffing needs.

Recommendations:

- Signage identifying the building as OPD Headquarters should be installed.
- Secured access to the current building should be reviewed and enhanced.
- A security review of the current facility should be undertaken to identify potential security enhancements.
- Hire a professional firm to conduct a proper space needs assessment.

Property and Evidence

Given a lack of space within the existing police facility, property and evidence, and operations related thereto, are contained within a separate city-owned building near the police facility. Ongoing renovations, minimal in nature, are being performed to accommodate the needs of the property and evidence function.

An initial assessment of this building revealed security issues. These included the lack of any intrusion alarm, video monitoring, or proper access security. Additionally, numerous windows, despite have interior security screens, pose a burglary risk. ICMA recommends that access to this building be via electronic, time-stamped fob or similar device; that the building be alarmed and video monitored 24/7; and that the exterior windows be properly filled to prevent unauthorized access.

A relatively recent addition to OPD staff is a civilian evidence technician, working an average of twenty hours per week, to administer property and evidence operations. Given the volume of activity occurring in this area, this position is certainly warranted. An inspection of property, evidence, and related records show that this civilian is more than up to the task and is fully engaged in ensuring that best practices are used, within the limitations of the facility, in all aspects of the operation. The evidence technician has also taken self-initiated steps to better educate herself on managing a modern property and evidence operation. The large number of items maintained by the OPD were plainly identified and well organized, with related files easily retrieved and similarly well organized. OPD should be commended for identifying ways to manage the challenges posed by a scarcity of resources.

Property and evidence collected by officers is "logged into" the JUSTICE software by the officer—no paper forms are used. Property and evidence can be classified as follows: damaged; evidence; found; lost; safekeeping; or stolen. Once logged in, the property is placed into one of several repurposed gym or utility type lockers and the locker number noted in JUSTICE. The officer then retrieves an unlocked padlock and secures the locker. The keys to the padlocks are not available to patrol officers; keys to the padlocks are secured within a separate, locked locker and access is restricted to the evidence technician, sergeants, and the chief of police. This system of keys and lockers, while not ideal, is well managed. However, the department's inability to track personnel entry into the evidence area ought to be corrected.

The evidence technician then retrieves items from the lockers, audits the item(s) and the JUSTICE entry for correctness, assigns the item(s) sequentially numbered tags, and then moves the item to a separate, secure area, noting the new location in the 'comments' section of the JUSTICE property entry. The OPD does not have any ability to barcode or electronically log and track evidence and property. Any potential software upgrades explored by a technology committee or similar panel should include the property and evidence function.

Once a disposition directive regarding an item is received, the evidence technician sends a letter to the owner or custodian of the item to retrieve same, or should the court order the item destroyed, the evidence technician supervises the destruction of the item. Property remaining unclaimed after owner notification is either destroyed or, if suitable, donated to charity.

ICMA staff was advised that the state of Oregon does not routinely audit the property and evidence function of municipal police departments.

Recommendations:

- Security upgrades for the property and evidence facility, as detailed, should be given a high priority.
- Installation of proper evidence lockers should be part of any initiative to upgrade the police facility.
- Any software upgrades should include a system to electronically tag, scan, and track property and evidence.

Building a Culture of Performance

The OPD is providing outstanding services to the Ontario community, but is experiencing a shortage in resources that is inhibiting its ability to perform. Additional personnel and technological resources are necessary in order for the department to improve operations. This section of the report provides an overview of the approach required to develop a culture of performance in the OPD. This approach builds upon the foundation in place, seeks to leverage departmental resources, and offers alternatives to manage the crime and disorder that occur in Ontario. A performance-based approach will integrate measures and accountability into the existing organizational culture, and will redeploy resources in the department in order to position it more effectively to confront the challenges of crime, traffic, and disorder present in the community.

Performance-based policing approaches police management from three perspectives: philosophical, strategic, and tactical.

Philosophical Approaches to Policing

Over the last several decades, the police profession has been struggling to define the appropriate response to crime, disorder, and public safety issues. In the 1960s, it became clear that the traditional approach to crime control (rapid response to CFS, random patrol, and reactive investigations) was not sufficient for dealing with crime. In response, and in the wake of community dissatisfaction with the police, community policing emerged as the dominant philosophy. Community policing was built upon the notion that the police and the community would work in partnership to deal with important issues. Integrated in this approach was problem-oriented policing, in which the police/community team would collaboratively identify and solve problems together.

However, with the dramatic increase in crime in the 1970s and 1980s, and the inability of community policing to adequately deal with crime, departments began experimenting with alternative approaches. Most notably, in 1994 (and continuing today) the New York Police Department (NYPD) implemented Compstat. Compstat is a crime management process of systematic problem solving with geographic accountability at the precinct level. The NYPD devolved responsibility and accountability to precinct-level commanders and used crime statistics to rigorously track commanders' performance. Emerging out of these efforts, police departments across the country began using data in creative ways to address crime. The policing philosophies called "Intelligence-Led Policing," "Predictive-Policing," and D.D.A.C.T.S. (Data Driven Approach to Crime and Traffic Safety) have been embraced as approaches to crime, traffic, and public safety. All of them rely on the use of data for decision making and to structure police operations.

There are numerous flaws to these approaches and caution must be exercised in relying too heavily on one approach over the other. For example, the predictive-policing philosophy suggests that the police can "predict" criminal behavior based upon past statistical data. Even the most expert forensic psychologists will explain that the ability to predict future behavior is not much greater

than chance, even with validated assessment tools and clinical observations. The ability of a police department to predict behavior, therefore, would be very limited. Additionally, these approaches have the competing problems of being both too broad and too narrow. D.D.A.C.T.S. posits that both crime and traffic can be addressed by aggressive traffic enforcement. Ambitious in its approach, this assumes that crime and traffic are related somehow and that enforcing traffic laws will somehow impact the incidence of serious violent and property crime. Undoubtedly, police presence in crime-prone areas can have a deterrent effect on crime, but unless the root causes of that crime are addressed, the police efforts will only have minimal impact. Also, a police philosophy centered only on crime reduction is too narrow. The police have a broad-based mission, with the reduction of crime being one important part of that mission. Basing a management philosophy narrowly on crime reduction ignores the other critical elements of police operations. Any management philosophy needs to integrate several other important police organizational goals.

ICMA recommends a performance-based approach to management. A performance-based approach demands that appropriate measures be developed and tracked to ensure that plans, policies, and programs are effective in achieving the goals of the department. Mark Moore and Anthony Braga (2004) in their article "Police Performance Measures" argue that six general measures are appropriate to evaluate the performance of a police agency. According to Moore and Braga, a police department should 1) reduce crime, 2) hold offenders accountable, 3) reduce the fear of crime and promote security, 4) encourage public-centered crime defense programs, 5) improve traffic safety, and 6) provide essential emergency services. These categories can also be translated into measurable goals:

- To identify criminal offenders and criminal activity and when appropriate, to apprehend offenders, and participate in subsequent court proceedings.
- To prevent the commission of crimes through proactive techniques by reducing the opportunities for such crimes.
- To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community.
- To ensure safe and expeditious movement of vehicle traffic on public roadways.
- To reduce traffic deaths through engineering, education, and enforcement.
- To provide citizens with educational information regarding the police function and crime prevention.

From a performance-based perspective, each of these six broad areas of police responsibility should be part of the police mandate. Each of these measures should be measured, and plans and tactics should be created to achieve success in each area.

It is recommended the OPD establish measures for each one of the six categories and that the police department be held accountable for achieving improvements in each area. While there is no exact measure for each area, it is suggested that the following data be used to track performance:

Performance Domain	Measure
1. Reduce crime	UCR Aggravated Assault and Burglary
2. Holding Offenders Accountable	Clearance Rates
3. Reducing fear	ICMA – National Citizen Survey
4. Public-centered crime defense	Crime Prevention Program Usage
5. Traffic Safety	Traffic Accidents and Injuries
6. Providing Emergency Services	CFS Response Time and Saturation Index

These areas of performance, with the appropriate measures, become the focus of the police department. All programs, plans, strategies, tactics, and efforts are directed at improving measures in performance domains. Frequent and regular reporting of the information, planning/strategy meetings, and organizational accountability are all critical for achieving the desired results.

Strategic Planning

The OPD does not have a strategic plan and does not engage in the planning process for most facets of the organization. Strategic plans must be created to address problem crime, disorder, and community problems. Strategic planning begins with a thorough analysis of the issues. Times, days, locations, types of property stolen, hot spots, frequent offenders/known recidivists, wanted persons, and so on, must all be identified at frequent and regular intervals. Armed with this information, a coordinated and integrated plan must be created that involves all elements of the OPD. For example, the role of patrol officers and detectives must be clearly established. And these roles, tasks, and responsibilities must be driven by the information presented.

More thorough, quicker, and deliberate analysis of information and the creation of actionable intelligence leading to an immediate deployment of resources will shorten the cycle between crime and arrest. A shorter cycle leads to greater efficiency and fewer instances of crime. It also lessens the possibility that good police work is left up to the motivation of individual officers, or worse, chance. Rather, results are driven by deliberate actions of the entire department. The outcome of a strategic planning approach will be a more robust response and fewer police incidents in Ontario.

The unique elements of the Ontario community need to be considered in developing such a plan. The common denominators, however, are that such a plan must be based on a thorough analysis of the problems and must involve all facets of the OPD (in other words, it is not a patrol plan or an investigative plan). A plan must include measures developed to evaluate performance, and the department must regularly track progress and alter tactics in response to changing conditions. The plan must also be written and distributed to all personnel involved.[10]

[10] Elements of a strategic plan regarding thefts might include the following: Deployment and activity of patrol and specialized units in hot spots; monitoring of repeat/known offenders; interrogating all persons arrested

In addition to being in writing and widely distributed, the plans must be continuously monitored to ensure compliance, to track results, and to make adjustments to the plans in areas that are not working. This is a continuous process. In other words, the plan is not just a document that sits on the shelf, or something that is written at the end of each year, it is a performance-based document that is used to measure past results as well as direct future efforts. The timing of when performance is reviewed varies. In the NYPD for example, Compstat meetings are held weekly or more frequently if necessary. Smaller agencies with more localized issues might consider a longer time in between strategy sessions. For beginning programs, ICMA recommends weekly strategy sessions until the process becomes formalized. At these sessions performance data is analyzed, problems are identified, and plans developed in conjunction with the entire leadership of the department.

Tactics

Currently, the operations of the OPD are almost entirely reactive. The department, however, recognizes this reactive posture and is making strides to change to a more proactive approach. Staffing a crime analyst/criminal intelligence function with a trained individual, and implementing a targeted enforcement approach, would be excellent first steps for developing performance-based management. The OPD needs to integrate timely data that represent the six areas identified above, integrate all of the operational elements of the department, and hold the appropriate members of the department accountable for executing the strategic plans.

From a tactical perspective, the strategies need to be broken down into concrete actions that operational members of the department can perform on a day-to-day basis. These actions, or tactics, should be driven by the data and evaluated continuously. It is impossible to recommend specific tactics to implement, but they should involve the primary operational elements of the OPD (patrol and investigations), entail both reactive and proactive approaches, and be centered on crime-prone places and crime-prone people.

Research has shown that crime is generally not a random occurrence. There is a large body of work that demonstrates that the police can be very effective when they concentrate enforcement activities in crime-prone locations, known as "hot spots." Enforcement and police presence are essential to dealing with crime in a hot spot, but the "spot" (actual physical location) needs to be addressed as well. Performing target enforcement at the hot spot is just one part of the approach. The physical location needs to be targeted as well. What is it about the "spot" that is generating crime? Is it a lack of lighting, or an absent landlord, or graffiti, or an unruly nightclub, etc.? What is it about the location that is causing crime, and how can the department use the law to reestablish order to that location? The OPD already takes an aggressive stance towards disorderly locations through code enforcement and this approach should be continued. The difference here is that the

for any form of theft to learn motives, tactics, associates, etc.; identifying and monitoring pawn shop/fencing locations; public education and programs, public service announcements; performing sting operations; establishing heightened prosecution programs for shoplifting and other theft offenses; working closely with private security; working with building and property managers to provide greater physical security measures; and pickpocket or other training.

code enforcement is not just community improvement, but a means to eliminate the crime conditions that are associated with the properties in question. Understanding where and when crime is occurring by means of thorough analysis can identify properties that support the crime and then code enforcement can be used as just one mechanism to eliminate the crime and other disorderly conditions present at the location.

To begin this approach, ICMA recommends that the OPD focus on the crimes of aggravated assault and burglary. These two categories of crime are frequent enough and serious enough that the OPD would be able to have an almost immediate impact on the occurrence of crime. The department should conduct a thorough crime analysis of these events. Using three months of data, the department should determine when and where these crimes are occurring, what property is being taken, etc. in order to determine patterns and trends. Armed with this information patrol units can be directed to conduct appropriate tactics to reduce the crimes.

Also, research has shown that a large number of crimes in a community are committed by a small number of individuals. While the exact percentage is unclear, some studies have shown that upwards of 60 percent of all crime is committed by as few as 6 percent of all people. Essentially, very small numbers of people in a community are responsible for the large majority of criminal offending. The department needs to establish tactics focused on these "hot people" in order to more effectively address crimes. For example, recidivist criminals, gangs, drug dealers, etc. can have a very negative impact on a community. Research also indicates that prolific offenders do not discriminate in their offending and will commit hundreds of crimes in all categories until apprehended. In other words, one person will commit burglary, robbery, shoplifting, and other crime several times each day in order to meet his or her needs and they will not stop until caught. Identifying these individuals and tracking and monitoring them aggressively is the necessary approach.

With these elements in mind, the OPD should create tactics that focus on "hot spots" and "hot people," and that involve reactive and proactive patrol and investigative units.

For burglary, these tactics might include:

- Enforcing daytime curfew laws in order to return truant children to school
- Conducting residential and commercial security surveys.
- Conducting inspections of second-hand stores to possibly uncover stolen goods
- Conducting high-visibility patrols and traffic enforcement in the target areas
- Interviewing ALL arrested persons to determine their knowledge of local burglaries in the community
- Maintaining a list of all recidivist burglars in the community and regularly monitoring their whereabouts and periodically checking these individuals for warrants.
- Coordinating parole and probation home visits to supervised individuals, focusing specifically on offenders with a history of burglary.

- Conducting vigorous preliminary investigations at crime scenes to collect as much forensic evidence as possible.
- Conducting neighborhood canvasses at past crime scenes
- Enlisting community members to be block watchers and organize community groups to participate in their own self-protection.

For aggravated assault these tactics might include:

- Instituting vigorous antigang strategies.
- Continued aggressive domestic violence prevention efforts.
- Multi-agency enforcement of rules and regulations governing bars and nightclubs.
- Creating safe corridors for children leaving school, as well as antibullying initiatives and after-school programs.
- Reinforcement of proper tactics when responding to all incidents to minimize assaults on OPD officers.

The tactics defy description because each location is unique with a unique set of circumstances. However, the department needs to consider these circumstances, and bring its efforts to bear on the location.

The OPD needs to develop the data-gathering process that properly identifies the hot spots and hot people. Once the targets are identified, the OPD must then create the appropriate tactics involving both patrol and investigations in both proactive and reactive ways. In addition, authority and responsibility must be assigned for executing these tactics and a lead individual or individuals must be held accountable for their execution. And lastly, the department must establish a regular forum in which to discuss the success or failure of these efforts.

With the software technology that is now available, crime, traffic, and quality-of-life conditions can be mapped and tracked in order to better manage the conditions and ensure that they are being addressed. The concept of putting "cops-on-the-dots," meaning deploying resources where and when the problems exist and then aggressively tracking the conditions to make sure they are ameliorated, is part of contemporary police management. Inspection of the station house facility reveals that mapping technology is not used to any great extent and crime analysis and intelligence is not being disseminated in a coordinated manner to officers in the agency. In fairness to the OPD, the community is small enough and the issues predictable enough that officers formulate a common working knowledge of the community, which may make sophisticated planning methods unnecessary. However, perhaps it is time to replace the intuitive approach with an approach based upon the contemporary principles of strategic planning.

The strategic planning process, including the use of MIS and GIS software, proper planning, deployment, and follow-up, is a circular process that uses feedback from enforcement and deployment efforts to readjust future operations and deployment. This creates feedback-loops and

the organization learns from its successes and failures and more effectively uses enforcement resources. Incident analysis, intelligence, mapping, and strategy development are critical components of this process and the OPD could benefit substantially from employing these efforts more deliberately and more universally in the department.

Accountability

Accountability is another essential component of this process. Someone in the OPD needs to be accountable for two major parts of the strategic plan: 1) ensuring that enforcement efforts are directed properly (the right levels, and the right offenses, times, and locations), and 2) making sure that the conditions are being monitored and tactics changed in response to the changing conditions. This is not a role for the officer on patrol, but someone must be the "quarterback" of these efforts. The department should leverage the newly created operations commander to coordinate these efforts. This position would be responsible for coordinating patrol and investigative resources and ensuring that all elements of the OPD are working in a coordinated approach to combat crime in the community.

Accountability is a major component of performance-based policing. If no one is accountable for the proper execution of strategies and tactics, success will not be achieved. If everyone is accountable, then no one is accountable, and a deliberate effort must be made to assign accountability. In other words, one person needs to be accountable for the execution of crime reduction and other initiatives. Leveraging the captain position might be a way to assign accountability to these individuals. The crime and disorderly conditions are often related to the time of day (residential burglaries in the day for example), that might lend themselves to accountability during the times of day when they occur. Under the leadership of the operations commander (captain), a specific set of crime, traffic, and disorder conditions can be selected and assigned to the squad sergeants on each shift. For example, the daytime sergeants would have the responsibility of managing residential burglaries, assaults associated with school dismissal, school events, etc., and daytime traffic control. The nighttime sergeants would be responsible for domestic violence initiatives, problems generated by bars and clubs, DUI enforcement, etc. Each shift would have an identified set of problems to be tracked and addressed by patrol and investigations. The operations commander would be responsible for coordinating the efforts of the entire department. It is essential that accountability gets assigned to the most appropriate place in the organization that will be able to accomplish the goals of reducing crime and disorder.

The performance-based approach to policing relies on accurate and timely data that measure the six critical areas of operation. Armed with these data the department can make strategic and tactical decisions that involve all units in the department. In addition, the results of these efforts need to be monitored continuously and responsibility and accountability must be assigned to the appropriate person(s) in the department and who will be able to execute these strategies and tactics effectively. The integration of these many components will create a culture of performance that builds upon the current success of the OPD and leverages the existing technology and personnel in a more deliberate fashion.

Recommendations:

- Explore the development and implementation of a performance-based approach to manage the police department.
- The department must develop and implement a multiyear strategic plan. ICMA appreciates the fact the department has not experienced an appreciable increase in staffing, funding, and/or resources over the past several years. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the department jointly develop reasonable, obtainable performance goals and a mechanism for tracking its relative degree of progress in achieving stated goals. Indeed, the close review of operations required of a strategic planning process will assist the department in demonstrating the need for additional resources.
- The department should hold regular meetings for all supervisory staff to discuss the performance and operations of the department and its personnel. These command staff meetings should be scheduled monthly and should include a detailed discussion of crime and performance data (such as arrest and summons activity, sick time and overtime expenditures, the number of medical calls responded to, response times, individual case review, etc.) for the purpose of collaboration, accountability, and the development of effective strategies. Particular focus should be placed upon identifying the results of directed patrol operations. (For example, to determine whether enhanced enforcement in an area known for speeding has resulted in any decrease in reported vehicle accidents.)
- The department needs to use these meetings for proactive and strategic planning. In addition to reflecting upon what was done and what is currently being done, the department needs to clearly plan what will be done and establish a clear process for measuring the relative degree of progress made toward stated goals.
- A data dashboard system can record and track any or all of the following performance indicators:
    - The total number of reported crimes, by category, by time and day of the week.
    - The geographic location (i.e., zone) and time of all arrests.
    - The geographic location and time of citations issued.
    - The type and number of civilian and internal complaints (and dispositions).
    - The type, number, location, and time of civilian vehicle accidents.
    - The type, number, location, and time of department vehicle accidents, both “at fault” and “no fault” accidents.
    - The type, number, location, and nature of all “shots fired” calls
    - The type, location, and number of any *Terry* stops performed, as well as a description of all individuals involved and a description of all actions taken.
- An effective performance dashboard should also include traditional administration and budgetary measures, such as monthly and annual totals for sick time, comp time, and overtime.

- The specific performance measures to be tracked and reported at command staff meetings are entirely up to the department. All police agencies have unique missions, challenges, and demands. Outside performance benchmarks or measures should not be imposed upon the department—they should be derived from within.
- It is imperative that baseline levels be established for all performance categories. This entails measuring a category over a period of months, calculating percentage increases and decreases, computing year-to-date totals, and averaging monthly totals in order to determine seasonal variation and to obtain overall performance levels for the agency. There is likely to be much seasonal variation in the work of the department (e.g., extreme weather events). Such analysis can also include sector and individual officer performance review. For example, discrete patterns can emerge from analyzing when and where department-involved vehicle accidents occur. This performance information is invaluable in terms of determining optimum staffing levels.
- Personal accountability by supervisors is of critical importance. Patrol supervisors should generally be accountable for work being performed during their particular shifts. They obviously cannot be held accountable for the crimes themselves, but for using best efforts to respond to them, to identify patterns, and to formulate plans and solutions to address continuing problems and conditions. Patrol supervisors should therefore take an active role in these meetings.
- The department should be vigilant in identifying new performance indicators. "Key" performance indicators should be identified, with an understanding that they can always be expanded or modified at a later date. These indicators should always form the basis of discussions at command staff meetings.
- Any substantive changes to the current performance management framework must be communicated to, understood by, and acted upon by all members of the department.
- Command staff meetings should utilize simple data visualization tools, such as graphs and maps.
- The department must develop weekly or monthly activity sheets for patrol officers, and detectives. They must prepare these activity sheets to summarize their personal patrol and investigative activities. It is important for personnel to self-report personal activity, as it enhances an overall sense of supervision and personal accountability. This also serves as a redundant system of checks and balances for important performance measures. Supervisors should monitor on a continuous basis the personal performance of all members of the department.
- In light of the numerous recommendations in this report relating to enhanced data analysis and reporting activities, ICMA strongly recommends that the department be provided with a nonsworn administrative assistant to assist with these activities and functions.

Summary

The Ontario Police Department is a professional police agency that provides excellent service to the community. Notwithstanding the dedication of the personnel, crime rates are very high, traffic accidents are increasing, and the amount of physical and social disorder in the community needs to be addressed.

The department is under-resourced from both a personnel and equipment perspective. Additional sworn and civilian personnel are needed, as are much needed upgrades to the department's technological systems (hardware and software) and physical plant. In addition, there are several areas where modifying the personnel allocation could produce better outcomes and improve the overall function of the department and allow it to provide improved services to the community.

It is recommended that the OPD embrace a rigorous process of strategic planning for major elements of operations. At a minimum, strategic plans should be created to address traffic safety, serious crime, and crime prevention. These plans should be comprehensive and engage all levels of the organization from patrol, to criminal investigations, to administration.

The recommendations provided in this report should be viewed not as criticisms of the department, but as improvement opportunities that will allow the OPD to bring its overall performance to even higher levels.

Appendix: Data Analysis

Introduction

This data analysis on police patrol operations in Ontario, Oregon, which was conducted by the ICMA Center for Public Safety Management, focuses on three main areas: workload, deployment, and response times. These three areas are related almost exclusively to patrol operations, which constitute a significant portion of the police department's personnel and financial commitment.

All information in this analysis was developed directly from the data collected by the Ontario Police Department.

The majority of the first section of the report, concluding with Table D8, uses call and activity data for the entire year, from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013. For the detailed workload analysis and the response-time analysis, we use two four-week sample periods. The first period is February 2013 (February 1 to February 28), or winter, and the second period is August 2013 (August 1 to August 28), or summer.

Workload Analysis

When we analyze a set of dispatch records, we go through a series of steps:

1. We first process the data to improve its accuracy. For example, we remove duplicate units recorded on a single event. In addition, we remove records that do not indicate an actual activity. We also remove incomplete data. This includes situations where there is not enough time information to evaluate the record.
2. At this point, we have a series of records that we call "events." We identify these events in three ways.
    - We distinguish between patrol and nonpatrol units.
    - We assign a category to each event based upon its description.
    - We indicate whether the call is "zero time on scene," "police initiated," or "other initiated."
3. Then, we remove all records that do not involve a patrol unit to get a total number of patrol-related **events**.
4. At important points during our analysis, we focus on a smaller group of events designed to represent actual **calls** for service. This excludes events with no officer time spent on scene and out-of-service activities.

In this way, we first identify a total number of records, and then limit ourselves to patrol events, and finally focus on calls for service.

As with similar cases around the country, we encountered a number of issues when analyzing the dispatch data. We made assumptions and decisions to address these issues.

- The system only recorded information to the nearest minute. This makes any individual call's response time inaccurate. Averaging over large numbers of calls makes the results reported here more accurate; however, we would advise modifying the system to capture more accurate timestamps.
- While the dispatch system did maintain fields to indicate when a call involved up to four units, the system did not record individual times for each responding unit. Lacking additional information, we had to assume that each unit spent exactly the same amount of time on a given call. When reviewed, this assumption led to numerous instances where a unit would appear to be assigned to two calls simultaneously. At the least, this leads us to overestimate the department's measurable workload by at least 573 hours for the year, or 1.6 hours daily.
- No priorities were assigned to calls. Normally we would differentiate between police response to high-priority and low-priority calls, but this was not possible in this report.
- A moderate number (2.4 percent or approximately 298) of events involving patrol units showed less than thirty seconds of time spent on scene. We call this zero time on scene. We assumed zero time on scene to account for a significant portion of calls canceled en route.

- The computer-aided dispatch system used approximately 375 different offense descriptions, which we reduced to eighteen categories for our tables and ten categories for our figures (shown in Chart D1).

In the period from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2013, there were approximately 16,646 events assigned to the Ontario Police Department. Of those 16,646 events, about 12,304 events included an adequate record of a patrol unit as either the primary or secondary unit. This translates into an average of 33.7 events per day. As mentioned, approximately 2.4 percent of these events (an average of approximately one per day) had less than 30 seconds spent on the call.

In the following pages we show two types of data: activity and workload. The activity levels are measured by the average number of calls per day, broken down by the type and origin of the calls and categorized by the nature of the calls (crime, traffic, etc.). Workloads are measured in average work-hours per day.

We used nineteen call categories in report tables and ten categories in report graphs/figures, as shown here in the chart.

CHART D1: Call Categories Used in Tables and Figures

Table Categories	Figure Categories
Prisoner–arrest	Arrest
Prisoner–transport	
Assist other agency	Assist other agency
Crime–persons	Crime
Crime–property	
Public order	
Directed patrol	Directed patrol
Animal calls	General noncriminal
Miscellaneous	
Alarm	Investigations
Check/investigation	
Juvenile	Juvenile
Out of service–administrative	Out of service
Out of service–personal	
Disturbance	Suspicious incident
Suspicious person/vehicle	
Accidents	Traffic
Traffic enforcement	

FIGURE D1: Percentage Events per Day, by Initiator



Note: Percentages are based on a total of 12,304 events.

TABLE D1: Events per Day, by Initiator

Initiator	Total Events	Events per Day
Zero on-scene	298	0.8
Police initiated	5,173	14.2
Other initiated	6,883	18.7
Total	**12,304**	**33.7**

Observations:

- 2 percent of the events had zero time on scene.
- 42 percent of all events were police-initiated.
- 56 percent of all events were other-initiated.
- There was an average of 34 events per day, or 1.4 per hour.

FIGURE D2: Percentage Events per Day, by Category



Note: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart D1.

TABLE D2: Events per Day, by Category

Category	Total Events	Events per Day
Accidents	403	1.1
Alarm	231	0.6
Animal calls	324	0.9
Assist other agency	651	1.8
Check/investigation	2,598	7.1
Crime–persons	768	2.1
Crime–property	1,716	4.7
Directed patrol	155	0.4
Disturbance	618	1.7
Juvenile	90	0.2
Miscellaneous	657	1.8
Out of service–administrative	853	2.3
Out of service–personal	184	0.5
Prisoner–arrest	385	1.1
Prisoner–transport	308	0.8
Public order	222	0.6
Suspicious person/vehicle	511	1.4
Traffic enforcement	1,630	4.5
Total	**12,304**	**33.7**

Observations:

- The top three categories (investigations, crime, and traffic) accounted for 62 percent of events.
- 23 percent of events were investigations.
- 22 percent of events were crimes.
- 17 percent of events were traffic-related.

FIGURE D3: Percentage Calls per Day, by Category



Note: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart D1.

TABLE D3: Calls per Day, by Category

Category	Total Calls	Calls per Day
Accidents	400	1.1
Alarm	224	0.6
Animal calls	320	0.9
Assist other agency	632	1.7
Check/investigation	2,549	7.0
Crime–persons	753	2.1
Crime–property	1,627	4.5
Disturbance	608	1.7
Juvenile	89	0.2
Miscellaneous	630	1.7
Prisoner–arrest	373	1.0
Prisoner–transport	307	0.8
Public order	214	0.6
Suspicious person/vehicle	499	1.4
Traffic enforcement	1,611	4.4
Total	**10,836**	**29.7**

Note: The focus here is on recorded calls rather than recorded events. We removed events with zero time on scene, directed-patrol events, and out-of-service activities.

Observations:

- There was an average of 29.7 calls per day, or 1.2 per hour.
- The top three categories (investigations, crime, and traffic) accounted for 68 percent of calls.
- 26 percent of calls were investigations.
- 24 percent of calls were crime.
- 19 percent of calls were traffic.

FIGURE D4: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months



TABLE D4: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months

Initiator	Jan-Feb	Mar-Apr	May-Jun	Jul-Aug	Sep-Oct	Nov-Dec
Police	12.3	10.4	13.0	10.5	10.6	9.0
Other	15.9	18.6	20.3	20.5	20.8	16.1
Total	**28.3**	**29.0**	**33.3**	**30.9**	**31.4**	**25.2**

Observations:

- The number of calls per day was lowest in November-December.
- The number of calls per day was highest in May-June.
- The months with the most calls had 33 percent more calls than the months with the fewest calls.
- May-June had the most police-initiated calls, with 44 percent more than the period of November-December, which had the fewest.
- September-October had the most other-initiated calls, with 30 percent more than the period of January-February which had the fewest.

FIGURE D5: Calls per Day, by Category and Months



Note: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart D1.

TABLE D5: Calls per Day, by Category and Months

Category	Jan-Feb	Mar-Apr	May-Jun	Jul-Aug	Sep-Oct	Nov-Dec
Accidents	0.9	1.0	1.2	0.8	1.3	1.3
Alarm	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6
Animal calls	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.1	0.7	0.7
Assist other agency	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.7
Check/investigation	7.1	6.5	7.8	7.1	8.2	5.2
Crime–persons	1.9	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.1	1.7
Crime–property	3.2	4.6	4.6	4.9	5.6	3.8
Disturbance	1.6	1.5	1.6	2.0	1.8	1.6
Juvenile	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.2
Miscellaneous	1.6	2.1	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.4
Prisoner–arrest	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.0
Prisoner–transport	0.9	0.7	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.8
Public order	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.5
Suspicious person/vehicle	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.3
Traffic enforcement	5.0	4.3	6.4	3.9	3.5	3.5
Total	**28.3**	**29.0**	**33.3**	**30.9**	**31.4**	**25.2**

Note: Calculations were limited to calls rather than events.

Observations:

- The top three categories (investigations, crime, and traffic) averaged between 66 and 71 percent of calls throughout the year.
- Investigations calls averaged between 5.8 and 8.8 calls per day throughout the year.
- Crime calls averaged between 5.6 and 8.3 calls per day throughout the year. They accounted for 20 to 26 percent of total calls.
- Traffic calls averaged between 4.6 and 7.6 calls per day throughout the year.

FIGURE D6: Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator



Note: The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description in Chart D1.

TABLE D6: Primary Unit's Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator

Category	Police Initiated		Other Initiated	
	Total Calls	Minutes	Total Calls	Minutes
Accidents	13	41.9	387	28.7
Alarm	2	12.5	222	12.1
Animal calls	13	27.6	306	24.2
Assist other agency	203	21.5	426	27.9
Check/investigation	1,414	19.3	1,128	22.1
Crime–persons	26	20.1	725	29.2
Crime–property	137	15.7	1,483	24.3
Disturbance	17	16.4	591	19.5
Juvenile	8	30.5	81	28.0
Miscellaneous	223	22.4	407	22.2
Prisoner–arrest	218	25.4	154	22.9
Prisoner–transport	295	45.5	12	47.4
Public order	41	27.7	172	19.7
Suspicious person/vehicle	17	15.8	481	16.0
Traffic enforcement	1,370	9.5	236	21.4
Total	**3,997**	**18.6**	**6,811**	**23.2**

Note: We removed 28 calls with inaccurate busy times.

The information in Figure D6 and Table D6 is limited to calls and excludes all calls that show zero time on scene. A unit's occupied time is measured as the time from when the call was received until the unit becomes available. The times shown are the average occupied times per call for the primary unit, rather than the total occupied time for all units assigned to a call. Observations below refer to times shown within the figure rather than the table.

Observations:

- A unit's average time spent on a call ranged from 10 to 37 minutes overall.
- The longest average times were for police-initiated arrest calls. This was influenced primarily by long prisoner transports.
- The average time spent on crime calls was 25 minutes for other-initiated calls and 19 minutes for police-initiated calls.

FIGURE D7: Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category



Note: The categories in this figure use weighted averages to combine those of the following table according to the description in Chart D1.

TABLE D7: Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category

Category	Police-Initiated		Other-Initiated	
	Average	Total Calls	Average	Total Calls
Accidents	1.2	13	1.3	387
Alarm	1.5	2	1.7	222
Animal calls	1.2	13	1.1	307
Agency assist	1.2	203	1.3	429
Check/investigation	1.2	1,416	1.4	1,133
Crime–persons	1.3	26	1.6	727
Crime–property	1.2	137	1.3	1,490
Disturbance	1.7	17	1.7	591
Juvenile	1.4	8	1.1	81
Miscellaneous	1.2	223	1.3	407
Prisoner–arrest	1.7	219	1.6	154
Prisoner–transport	1.0	295	1.0	12
Public order	1.4	42	1.5	172
Suspicious person/vehicle	1.4	17	1.7	482
Traffic enforcement	1.1	1,372	1.4	239
Total	**1.2**	**4,003**	**1.4**	**6,833**

FIGURE D8: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-Initiated Calls



Note: The categories in this figure use weighted averages to combine those of the following table according to the description in Chart D1.

TABLE D8: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-Initiated Calls

Category	Responding units		
	One	Two	Three or more
Accidents	291	80	16
Alarm	94	99	29
Animal calls	280	25	2
Agency assist	323	76	30
Check/investigation	837	212	84
Crime–persons	418	200	109
Crime–property	1,197	213	80
Disturbance	263	239	89
Juvenile	71	8	2
Miscellaneous	320	70	17
Prisoner–arrest	100	26	28
Prisoner–transport	12	0	0
Public order	104	53	15
Suspicious person/vehicle	225	188	69
Traffic enforcement	171	52	16
Total	**4,706**	**1,541**	**586**

Note: The information in Table D7 and Figure D7 is limited to calls and excludes events with zero time on scene, as well as out-of-service records. The information in Table D8 and Figure D8 is further limited to other-initiated calls.

Observations:

- The overall mean number of responding units was 1.2 for police-initiated calls and 1.4 for other-initiated calls.
- The mean number of responding units was as high as 1.7 for suspicious incident calls that were other-initiated.
- 69 percent of other-initiated calls involved one responding unit.
- 23 percent of other-initiated calls involved two responding units.
- 9 percent of other-initiated calls involved three or more responding units.
- The largest group of calls with three or more responding units was for crime calls

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FIGURE D9: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Winter 2013



TABLE D9: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Winter 2013

Category	Per Day	
	Calls	Work Hours
Arrest	2.0	1.4
Assist other agency	1.8	0.9
Crime	4.8	3.3
General noncriminal	2.2	1.1
Investigations	7.4	3.2
Juvenile	0.3	0.1
Suspicious incident	2.9	1.4
Traffic	6.0	1.8
Total	**27.2**	**13.2**

Observations:

- Total calls averaged 27 per day, or 1.1 per hour.
- Total workload averaged 13 hours per day, meaning that on average 0.5 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Investigations calls constituted 27 percent of calls and 24 percent of workload.
- Traffic calls constituted 22 percent of calls and 14 percent of workload.
- Crime calls constituted 17 percent of calls and 25 percent of workload.
- These top three categories constituted 67 percent of calls and 63 percent of workload.

FIGURE D10: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Summer 2013



TABLE D10: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Summer 2013

Category	Per Day	
	Calls	Work Hours
Arrest	2.1	1.5
Assist other agency	1.7	0.7
Crime	8.4	4.4
General noncriminal	2.9	1.4
Investigations	7.9	3.4
Juvenile	0.2	0.2
Suspicious incident	4.0	2.0
Traffic	5.1	1.5
Total	**32.3**	**14.9**

Note: Workload calculations are focused on calls rather than events.

Observations:

- The average number of calls per day was higher in summer than in the winter.
- The summer workload was greater than in the winter.
- Total calls averaged 32 per day, or 1.3 per hour.
- Total workload averaged 15 hours per day, meaning that on average 0.6 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Crime calls constituted 26 percent of calls and 29 percent of workload.
- Investigations calls constituted 25 percent of calls and 23 percent of workload.
- Traffic calls constituted 16 percent of calls and 10 percent of workload.
- These top three categories constituted 66 percent of calls and 62 percent of workload.

Deployment

For this study, we examined deployment information for four weeks in the winter (February 2013) and four weeks in the summer (August 2013). The police department's main patrol force is scheduled using either 10-hour shifts or 12-hour shifts.

The Ontario Police Department's patrol force includes officers and sergeants. The department deployed an average of 3.5 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in winter 2013 and 3.3 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in summer 2013.

In this section, we describe the deployment and workload in distinct steps, distinguishing between summer and winter, and between weekdays and weekends:

- First, we focus on patrol deployment alone.
- Next, we compare the deployment against workload based upon other-initiated calls for service.
- Next, we compare the deployment against workload based upon "all" workload, including police-initiated calls, out-of service events, and directed patrol activities, in addition to other-initiated calls for service.

Comments follow each set of four figures, with separate discussions for summer and winter.

FIGURE D11: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2013



FIGURE D12: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2013



FIGURE D13: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2013



FIGURE D14: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2013



Observations:

- For winter 2013:
  - The average deployment was 3.5 officers per hour during the week and 3.4 officers per hour on the weekend.
  - Average deployment varied from 2.7 to 5.5 officers per hour on weekdays and 2.0 to 4.6 officers per hour on weekends.
- For summer 2013:
  - The average deployment was 3.2 officers per hour during the week and 3.5 officers per hour on the weekend.
  - Average deployment varied from 2.6 to 4.6 officers per hour on weekdays and 2.2 to 4.8 officers per hour on weekends.

FIGURE D15: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2013



FIGURE D16: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Winter 2013



FIGURE D17: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2013



FIGURE D18: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Summer 2013



Observations:

- For winter 2013:
  - Average other-initiated workload was 0.4 officers per hour during the week and 0.3 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 10 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 9 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 29 percent of deployment between 11:30 a.m. and 11:45 a.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 30 percent of deployment between 10:45 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
- For summer 2013:
  - Average other-initiated workload was 0.4 officers per hour during the week and 0.5 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 14 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 15 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 35 percent of deployment between 6:00 p.m. and 6:15 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 48 percent of deployment between 12:00 p.m. and 12:15 p.m., and between 2:00 p.m. and 2:15 p.m.

FIGURE D19: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2013



FIGURE D20: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2013



FIGURE D21: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2013



FIGURE D22: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2013



Note: Figures D19 to D22 include deployment along with all workload from other-initiated, police-initiated, out-of-service activities, and directed patrol events.

Observations:

- For winter 2013:
  - Average workload was 0.7 officers per hour during the week and 0.5 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 19 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 16 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 55 percent of deployment between 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 37 percent of deployment between 11:15 p.m. and 11:45 p.m.
- For summer 2013:
  - Average workload was 0.7 officers per hour during the week and on weekends.
  - This was approximately 21 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 20 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 48 percent of deployment between 12:00 p.m. and 12:15 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 55 percent of deployment between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m.

Response Times

We analyzed the response times to various types of calls, separating the duration into dispatch and travel times. We begin the discussion with statistics that include all calls combined. We analyzed several types of calls to determine whether response times varied by call type.

Before presenting the specific figures and tables, we summarize our observations. We started with 891 events for winter 2013 and 1,039 events for summer 2013. We limited our analysis to other-initiated calls. We also encountered some calls without arrival times that we were forced to exclude from our analysis due to lack of information. This left 366 calls in the winter and 578 calls in the summer for our analysis.

Our initial analysis examines the difference in response by time of day and compares summer and winter periods. It also shows differences in response times by category. After the overall statistics, the section includes a brief analysis of the response time for all other-initiated calls with dispatch and arrival times.

Response time is measured as the difference between when a call is received and when the first unit arrives on scene. This is further divided into dispatch delay and travel time. Dispatch delay is the time between when a call is received and when the first unit is dispatched. Travel time is the remaining time until the first unit arrives on scene.

FIGURE D23: Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, for Winter and Summer 2013



Observations:

- Average response times varied significantly by hour of day.
- In winter, the longest response times were between noon and 1:00 p.m. with an average of 16.8 minutes.
- In winter, the shortest response times were between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. with an average of 3.7 minutes.
- In summer, the longest response times were between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. with an average of 25.2 minutes.
- In summer, the shortest response times were between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. with an average of 3.8 minutes.

FIGURE D24: Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2013



FIGURE D25: Average Response Time by Category, Summer 2013



TABLE D11: Average Response Time Components, by Category

Category	Winter 2013			Summer 2013		
	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Dispatch	Travel	Response
Arrest	0.4	7.4	7.9	2.9	2.4	5.3
Assist other agency	2.2	6.9	9.0	0.9	5.3	6.3
Crime	8.1	5.6	13.7	6.1	5.3	11.5
General noncriminal	3.9	6.6	10.5	5.6	5.2	10.7
Investigations	3.6	3.8	7.4	4.5	5.1	9.6
Juvenile	4.8	11.2	16.0	3.7	4.5	8.2
Suspicious incident	5.4	3.8	9.2	3.3	4.3	7.6
Traffic	2.0	4.0	6.0	4.8	5.5	10.2
Total	**5.1**	**5.1**	**10.2**	**4.8**	**5.0**	**9.9**

Note: The total average is weighted according to the number of calls per category.

Observations:

- In winter, the average response time for most categories was between 6 minutes and 12 minutes.
- In winter, the average response time was as short as 6 minutes (for traffic-related calls) and as long as 14 minutes (for crimes).
- In summer, the average response time for most categories was between 5 minutes and 11 minutes.
- In summer, the average response time was as short as 5 minutes (for arrests) and as long as 11 minutes (for crimes).
- The average response time for crimes was approximately 14 minutes in winter and 11 minutes in summer.

TABLE D12: 90th Percentiles for Response Time Components, by Category

Category	Winter 2013			Summer 2013		
	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Dispatch	Travel	Response
Arrest	3.0	24.0	24.0	10.9	9.1	15.1
Assist other agency	7.6	14.6	25.0	2.2	12.2	14.1
Crime	24.9	13.0	34.7	16.0	11.0	28.0
General noncriminal	8.0	21.0	26.0	12.6	11.4	20.4
Investigations	5.8	8.4	16.2	14.4	10.4	24.8
Juvenile	9.0	28.0	32.0	17.0	8.0	20.0
Suspicious incident	8.6	7.0	16.6	6.0	8.0	16.0
Traffic	5.0	9.2	12.6	16.0	11.0	20.0
Total	**10.3**	**10.0**	**24.0**	**11.0**	**11.0**	**20.0**

Note: A 90th percentile value of 24 minutes means that 90 percent of all calls are responded to in fewer than 24 minutes. For this reason, the columns for dispatch delay and travel time may not be equal to the total response time.

Observations:

- In winter, the 90th percentile value for response time was as short as 13 minutes (for traffic-related calls) and as long as 35 minutes (for crimes).
- In winter, the 90th percentile value for response time was as short as 14 minutes (for agency assists) and as long as 28 minutes (for crimes).

END